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In January 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC")
adopted new rules governing the conduct of attorneys appearing and
practicing before it.' Those rules require attorneys to report "up-the-ladder"
within the client organization, and purport to immunize attorneys who
disclose client confidences to the SEC in certain circumstances.2 The SEC
has also proposed rules that would mandate reporting of client confidences
outside the client to the SEC.3 The provisions of the rules, both as proposed
and as adopted, raise important issues regarding traditional, state law
obligations of attorney-client confidentiality.
California attorneys have an obligation to maintain their clients' secrets.
This obligation springs from several independent sources: the State Bar Act,
4
the California Evidence Code,5 and the California Rules of Professional
Conduct as approved by the California Supreme Court.6 The State Bar Act
requires attorneys "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence[s], and at every
peril... to preserve the secrets, of his or her client[s].,, 7  Similarly, the
Evidence Code requires an attorney to assert the attorney-client privilege
whenever a party seeks disclosure of a privileged communication. The
obligation to maintain client confidences and preserve client secrets
embedded in these statutes reflects the long-standing recognition that society
benefits when clients receive advice informed by full and frank
communication with their legal counsel. The obligation also reflects a
policy that attorneys should avoid conflicts of interest with their clients . 9
The Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the
California State Bar (the "Corporations Committee") has prepared this
article to examine the existing legal conflicts between a California attorney's
1. Implementation of Standards of Prof I Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823 (87,069 et. seq.) (Jan. 29,
2003).
2. Id.
3. Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,802 (86,513 et. seq.) (Nov. 21,
2002).
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6238 (West 2003) (referred to in the text as the
"Business and Professions Code").
5. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 2003) (referred to in the text as the "Evidence Code").
6. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-100 to 5-400 (2001) (referred to in the text as the
"California Rules of Conduct").
7. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003). See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text. Clause (2) was added to Section 6068(e) in 2003 (effective July 1, 2004). Id. References to
Section 6068(e) in this article and in prior cases should be understood as a reference only to clause
().
8. CAL. EVID. CODE § 955 (West 2003).
9. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(E). See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying
text. As discussed infra in note 95, it is possible to understand Section 6068(e) as imposing an
obligation on an attorney to maintain his or her client's trust by avoiding conflicts and maintaining
the confidentiality of the client's communications.
statutory obligations to maintain client confidences and the SEC's new
attorney conduct rules)0° Part I of this article discusses the background of
the SEC's attorney conduct rules, Part II reviews the statutory and fiduciary
duties of California attorneys to maintain client confidences, and Part III
analyzes the SEC's authority to adopt its new attorney conduct rules and to
give them preemptive effect.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE SEC ATTORNEY CONDUCT RULES
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Related Rulemaking
The SEC's recent attorney conduct rulemaking has its genesis in Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" or,
simply, the "Act")."1 Enacted during the aftermath of allegations of massive
financial fraud at some of the country's largest and best-known companies,
this legislation received overwhelming bipartisan support. 12 President
George W. Bush signed the Act on July 30, 2002.1
3
Section 307 of the Act was proposed in an amendment to the Sarbanes-
Oxley bill by Senator John Edwards on July 10, 2002.14 The amendment
was adopted by the Senate unanimously, and accepted by the House in
conference. 15 As enacted, Section 307 provides:
10. In March 2004, the Corporations Committee and the Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct of the California State Bar (COPRAC) jointly issued a summary Ethics
Alert to all members of the California Bar, highlighting the major issues presented by the new SEC
rules and the impact they have on California attorneys. CORP. COMM. OF THE Bus. LAW SECTION &
COMM. ON PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT, STATE BAR OF CAL., ETHICS ALERT: THE
NEW SEC ATTORNEY CONDUCT RULES V. CALIFORNIA'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY (2004),
available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/SEC-ethics-alert.pdf. The Ethics Alert was published on
the State Bar's website and announced in the April 2004 issue of the CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL, the
official publication of the State Bar of California. Sarbanes-Oxley Rules Create Ethical Minefield
for Lawyers, CAL. ST. B.J., April 2004, at I & 6, available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/SEC-
ethics-alert.pdf. On behalf of the Corporations Committee, the members of the Drafting Committee
acknowledge that discussions, analysis, and drafting conducted jointly with COPRAC in preparation
of the Ethics Alert served as a valuable resource in the preparation of this article. Nonetheless, the
content of this article is the sole responsibility of the Corporations Committee and as such may not
be interpreted as representing an official position taken by COPRAC on any of the matters addressed
in this article.
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §
7245 (West Supp. 2004)).
12. The House of Representatives passed the Act by a 423-3 vote and the Senate passed the Act
by a 99-0 vote. Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms Into Law; President Says Era of "False
Profits" Is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4.
13. Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3763, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DoC. 1286 (July 30, 2002).
14. Senator Edwards practiced law in North Carolina before election to the Senate in 1998 and,
according to the North Carolina State Bar, remained active until April 12, 2000. See infra note 31
and accompanying text for the comments of the North Carolina Bar Association (a separate,
voluntary organization) on the initial proposal of the SEC under Section 307 of the Act.
15. See Jennifer Wheeler, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict With
the ABA's Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 461,
464-65 (2003).
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Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before
the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,
including a rule -
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to
the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial
measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring
the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
16
The SEC responded quickly to the mandate of Section 307 by proposing
new attorney conduct rules on November 21, 2002 (hereinafter the
"Proposing Release").17 As initially proposed, the rules would have required
attorneys to report evidence of material violations of law "up-the-ladder"
within an organization and, if the attorney did not receive an appropriate
response, to withdraw from the engagement under certain circumstances.1
8
The SEC adopted final rules with respect to "up-the-ladder" reporting that
were published in an adopting release dated January 29, 2003 (hereinafter
the "Adopting Release"). 19 These rules (hereinafter the "Part 205 Rules" or,
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307.
17. Implementation of Standards of Prof I Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,802 (86,513 et. seq.) (Nov. 21,
2002).
18. Id. The Business Law Section and the Corporations Committee of the California State Bar
jointly submitted a comment letter to the SEC with respect to the Proposing Release. Letter from the
Corp. Comm. & Bus. Law Section to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n
(December 16, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tghoxiql.htm. It
asserted four points: (i) the proposed rules conflict with California law; (ii) the conflict is not
necessary because it arises from the "noisy withdrawal" portion of the proposed rules that depart
from the letter and spirit of the Act; (iii) it is unclear that the SEC can impose its interpretation of
evidentiary and professional rules in contexts not involving the SEC; and (iv) the "reporting up"
requirements of the Act establish a mechanism whereby close or controversial legal issues are
exposed to scrutiny by independent directors. Id.
19. Implementation of Standards of Prof'I Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,823 (87,069 et. seq.) (Jan. 29,
2003).
simply, the "Rules") became effective on August 5, 2003.20 The Rules, as
adopted, did not include an obligation on the part of an attorney to "report
out" to the SEC.2' Nonetheless, the Adopting Release stated that the
reporting out component remains under consideration by the SEC.22
Moreover, the Rules do include a purported "safe harbor" provision for
attorneys who elect to report out to the SEC in certain circumstances.23
B. The Operative Requirement: Duty to Report Evidence of a Material
Violation
The basic mandate of the Part 205 Rules is set forth in Rule 205.3(b)(1):
If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission
in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director,
employee, or agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such
evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and its chief
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith.24
The relative brevity of Rule 205.3(b)(1) belies its complexity. It is, indeed,
heavily dependent on several defined terms which are used directly in it and
other terms set forth in existing provisions of the federal securities laws.
25
Several of the terms defined in the Rules refer to still other defined terms.
26
20. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Simultaneously with issuing the Adopting Release, the SEC issued a release proposing a
separate variant on the "noisy withdrawal" requirement in which the obligation would be placed on
the reporting company rather than on the attorney. Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct
for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,824 (87,111 et seq.) (Jan. 29, 2003).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2004). See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
24. § 205.3(b)(1).
25. The following definitions (set forth in the provision indicated) are particularly critical:
Attorney § 205.2(c)
Appearing and practicing before the Commission § 205.2(a)
In the representation of an issuer § 205. 2 (g)
Evidence of a material violation § 205.2(e)
Issuer § 205.2(h)
Material violation § 205.2(i)
Report § 205.2(n)
26. For example, "evidence of a material violation" uses the defined term "material violation,"
which is defined using the defined term "breach of fiduciary duty." § 205.2(e), (i).
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The definitions in the Rules are further complicated by the use of double
27
negatives.
C. The Unexpectedly Broad Scope of the Rules
Many lawyers may be surprised to find that they are, or may be, subject
to the Part 205 Rules. To determine whether an attorney is subject to the
Rules, three definitions must be considered: the Rule applies (i) only to
"attorneys", who are (ii) "appearing and practicing before the Commission
[SEC]" and (iii) "in the representation of an issuer."
The term "attorney" is defined to include both licensed attorneys and
anyone who holds himself or herself out as being admitted, licensed or
otherwise qualified to practice law. Under the Rules, an attorney will be
considered to be appearing and practicing before the SEC if he or she does
any of the following:
(i) Transact[s] any business with the [SEC], including
communications in any form;
(ii) Represent[s] an issuer in a[n] [SEC] administrative
proceeding or in connection with any [SEC] investigation,
inquiry, information request, or subpoena;
(iii) Provid[es] advice in respect of the United States securities
laws or the [SEC's] rules or regulations thereunder regarding
any document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or
submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will be
filed with or submitted to, the [SEC], including the provision of
such advice in the context of preparing, or participating in the
preparation of, any such document; or
27. For example, the definition of "evidence of a material violation" reads in part as follows:
"credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." § 205.2(e) (emphasis added). In a recently published
article, three law professors noted:
Law is intended to guide action in the world. Yet it is barely possible to read the SEC's
definition out loud without tripping (or, as we have discovered when presenting this
definition in various fora, chuckling) over the words, let alone trying to remember the
definition without reading it or trying to work out its "logic." Indeed, the provision is a
gross violation of the SEC's own "plain English" rules....
Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 725, 753 (2004). Other examples of the use of double negatives in definitions under the Rules
can be found in the definitions of "reasonable" and "reasonably believes." § 205.2(l), (m).
(iv) Advises an issuer as to whether information or a statement,
opinion, or other writing is required under the United States
securities laws or the [SEC's] rules or regulations...to be filed
with or submitted to, or incorporated into any document that
will be filed with or submitted to, the [SEC].
The latter two categories of activities do not require any direct
communication with, or appearance before, the SEC. Thus, these are not
based on commonly understood notions of what it means to appear and
practice before an agency. Rather, these categories focus on the substance
of the communication between lawyer and client. Given that the SEC's
definition of "appearing and practicing" does not require any direct
interaction between an attorney and the SEC, the definition is at odds with
its plain meaning.29  Many attorneys may not recognize that their
interactions with clients are now subject to SEC regulation under the Rules.
For example, an executive compensation lawyer who advises an issuer in
negotiating an employment contract with the issuer's chief executive officer
will be appearing and practicing before the SEC, assuming such lawyer
knows that the agreement will be filed with the SEC, and he or she provides
advice in respect to the U.S. securities laws or the SEC rules and
regulations.30 Lawyers who do not specialize in SEC practice may find that
they lack the knowledge and training to know whether they are subject to the
Part 205 Rules, much less what they must do to comply with them.3'
28. § 205.2(a)(l)(i)-(iv). The definition of "appearing and practicing" excludes an attorney who:
(i) performs any of the listed activities "other than in the context of providing legal services to an
issuer with whom the attorney has an attomey-client relationship; or (ii) [i]s a non-appearing foreign
attorney." § 205.2(a)(2). See § 205.20) for the definition of a non-appearing foreign attorney.
29. In adopting such an unusually expansive and counterintuitive definition of "appearing and
practicing," the SEC has gone beyond the plain meaning of the statute and has arguably exceeded its
rulemaking authority. The limits on an agency's power to adopt rules is discussed in Part III of this
article. See infra notes 204-244 and accompanying text.
30. Such contract is required to be filed as an exhibit to, among other things, an issuer's annual
report on Form 10-K pursuant to Item 601(b)(10)(iii)(A) of Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R §
229.601(b)(10)(iii)(A) (2004). The Adopting Release makes it clear that "an attorney must have
notice that a document he or she is preparing or assisting in preparing will be submitted to the
Commission to be deemed to be 'appearing and practicing"' under the revised definition.
Implementation of Standards of Prof I Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,823, at 87,072 (Jan. 29, 2003). It is
unclear what meaning will be ascribed to "in respect of" in the definition. It may be read to require
that the substance of the advice concerns securities laws or SEC rules and regulations. However, it
might mean simply relating or relevant to those laws or regulations. See Cramton et al., supra note
27, at 742-43; see also Dan K. Webb & Scott P. Glauberman, Up the Ladder: Litigator
Responsibilities under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, LITIGATION, Summer 2004, at 21, 23.
31. See Letter from J. Norfleet Pruden, II, President, and Lynn F. Chandler, Chair, Sarbanes-
Oxley Task Force of the Professionalism Comm., North Carolina Bar Association, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/jnpruden 1.htm; Letter from Tod Aronovitz, President, and Ian M. Comisky, Board
of Governors, The Florida Bar, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (April 7,
2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/flbarO40703.htm.
[Tihe definition of "lawyer" [sic] in the rule is so broad that it includes attorneys who
may have tangential relationships with SEC reporting matters, such as patent work,
review of corporate minutes, or closings on sales of corporate properties. These
attorneys, who have neither the means nor the knowledge to comply with Section 205,
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Even if an attorney is appearing and practicing before the SEC, the Rule
requires that the appearance or practice must be "in the representation of an
issuer., 32 This phrase is defined as "providing legal services as an attorney
for an issuer, regardless of whether the attorney is employed or retained by
the issuer."33 The term "issuer" has the definition set forth in Section 3 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter the "Exchange Act").34
However, for the purposes of the Rule, one of the following must also be
applicable:
35
the securities of the issuer are registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act;
36
the issuer is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act;37 or
the issuer files or has filed a registration statement that has not yet
become effective under the Securities Act of 1933, and that it has
not withdrawn.38
would still be caught in its net.
Id.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2004).
33. § 205.2(g) (emphasis added).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (2004).
The term "issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to issue any security; except
that with respect to certificates of deposit for securities, voting-trust certificates, or
collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an
unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors or of the fixed, restricted
management, or unit type, the term 'issuer' means the person or persons performing the
acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the
trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued; and except
that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities, the term "issuer" means
the person by whom the equipment or property is, or is to be, used.
Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(f) (2004).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 781(2004). Generally, registration is required if a company either: (i) is listed on
an exchange; or (ii) has total assets of more than $1 million and a class of equity securities held of
record by 500 or more persons. §§ 781(b), 78l(g)(1)(B).
37. § 78o(d). Reporting under Section 15(d) is triggered by the filing of a registration statement
that "has become effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended [15 U.S.C. § 77a et
seq.]." Id. Generally, these will be smaller issuers with securities that are traded in the over-the-
counter market but with insufficient assets or shareholders to be subject to registration under Section
12(g). This category of issuers also includes companies that have relatively few equity holders but
which have publicly offered debt securities.
38. § 77a et seq. (2004). This category includes companies that may be closely held but are in
the process of "going public" by filing a registration statement with the SEC under the Securities Act
of 1933. Id.
The Rule further provides that "the term 'issuer' includes any person
controlled by an issuer [if] an attorney provides legal services to [that]
person on behalf of, or at the behest, or for the benefit of the issuer,
regardless of whether the attorney is employed or retained by the issuer.
39
Accordingly, an attorney who is engaged solely by a subsidiary of an issuer
may be appearing and practicing in the representation of an issuer if he or
she acts on behalf, or at the behest, or for the benefit, of the issuer even when
that issuer is not actually the client of the attorney.4 ° One example of that
situation is when an attorney retained by a subsidiary is asked to assist in
preparing a portion of a document to be filed by the issuer with the SEC.
D. The Duty to Report "Up the Ladder"
The essential feature of the Part 205 Rules is a "reporting up-the-ladder"
procedure, as specifically required by Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.41 The obligation to follow such procedures arises when an attorney "in
the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a material
violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent" of an
applicable Federal or state securities law, or a "breach of fiduciary duty"
arising under Federal or state law or of a similar violation.42 In that event,
such attorney is obligated forthwith to report the evidence to the issuer's
"chief legal officer" or both its chief executive officer and chief legal
officer.4 3  However, if the attorney "reasonably believes" that such report
39. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h) (2004) (emphasis added).
40. This is an area in which lawyers are likely to be confused. A lawyer representing a
subsidiary might argue that he or she is not "appearing and practicing" before the SEC because that
definition specifically excludes lawyers who provide the listed services "other than in the context of
providing legal services to an issuer with whom the attorney has an attorney-client relationship." §
205.2(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added). However, the SEC has, as noted in the text, expanded the
definition of "issuer" for purposes of defining "appearing and practicing" and "in the representation
of an issuer" to include any person controlled by issuers. See § 205.2(a), (g), (h). In light of this
more expansive definition, the lawyer may in fact be providing listed services to an issuer with
whom the attorney has an attorney-client relationship. In the Adopting Release, the SEC made it
clear that it views the question of whether an attorney-client relationship exists is a federal question:
whether the provision of legal services under particular circumstances would or would
not establish an attorney-client relationship under the state laws or ethics codes of the
state where the attorney practices or is admitted may be relevant to, but will not be
controlling on, the issue under this part.
Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823, at 87,072 (Jan. 29, 2003). Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, says nothing about Congress delegating to the SEC the
authority to define when an attorney-client relationship exists - a question that has historically been
the subject of state law. See id. at 87,071 & fn. 5. A federal agency's authority to preempt state
laws is discussed infra in Part III.
41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2004); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2004).
42. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(1), 205.2(d).
43. § 205.3(b)(1). Certain exceptions are specified in the rule. See § 205.3(b)(6). "Evidence of
a material violation means credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." § 205.2(e) (emphasis omitted). A
"material violation" is defined as "a material violation of an applicable United States federal or state
securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or
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would be futile, the Rules authorize the attorney to report directly to an
authorized committee of the board of directors or to the entire board.
44
Upon receiving a report, the chief legal officer has two options. He or
she may refer the report to the issuer's "qualified legal compliance
committee" (a "QLCC") if the issuer has previously established such
committee.45 Alternatively (or if no QLCC has been established), he or she
a similar material violation of any United States federal or state law." § 205.2(i). A "breach of
fiduciary duty" is defined as "any breach of fiduciary or similar duty to the issuer recognized under
an applicable Federal or State statute or at common law, including but not limited to misfeasance,
nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of unlawful transactions." § 205.2(d).
The Part 205 Rules do not define "chief legal officer." In the case of attorneys representing
subsidiary corporations, it is unclear which violations will trigger a reporting obligation. As
discussed above, the Rules define "issuer" broadly for purposes of defining "appearing and
practicing" and "in the representation of an issuer." See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
However, the SEC did not assign this broad definition to other sections of the Rules. Thus, it is
possible that the violations must pertain to the parent in order to trigger a reporting obligation.
44. § 205.3(b)(4). "Reasonably believes" is defined to mean that "an attorney believes the matter
in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is not unreasonable." § 205.2(m).
45. § 205.3(b)(2). A "qualified legal compliance committee" is defined in § 205.2(k) as follows:
[A] committee of an issuer (which also may be an audit or other committee of the issuer)
that:
(1) Consists of at least one member of the issuer's audit committee (or, if the issuer
has no audit committee, one member from an equivalent committee of independent
directors) and two or more members of the issuer's board of directors who are not
employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer and who are not, in the case of a
registered investment company, "interested persons" as defined in section 2(a)(19)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19));
(2) Has adopted written procedures for the confidential receipt, retention, and
consideration of any report of evidence of a material violation under §205.3;
(3) Has been duly established by the issuer's board of directors, with the authority
and responsibility:
(i) To inform the issuer's chief legal officer and chief executive officer (or the
equivalents thereof) of any report of evidence of a material violation (except
in the circumstances described in §205.3(b)(4));
(ii) To determine whether an investigation is necessary regarding any report of
evidence of a material violation by the issuer, its officers, directors, employees
or agents and, if it determines an investigation is necessary or appropriate, to:
(A) Notify the audit committee or the full board of directors;
(B) Initiate an investigation, which may be conducted either by the chief
legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) or by outside attorneys; and
(C) Retain such additional expert personnel as the committee deems
necessary; and
(iii) At the conclusion of any such investigation, to:
(A) Recommend, by majority vote, that the issuer implement an
appropriate response to evidence of a material violation; and
(B) Inform the chief legal officer and the chief executive officer (or the
equivalents thereof) and the board of directors of the results of any such
investigation under this section and the appropriate remedial measures to
be adopted; and
(4) Has the authority and responsibility, acting by majority vote, to take all other
appropriate action, including the authority to notify the Commission in the event
that the issuer fails in any material respect to implement an appropriate response
that the qualified legal compliance committee has recommended the issuer to take.
§ 205.2(k).
must "cause such inquiry into the evidence of a material violation as he or
she reasonably believes is appropriate to determine whether the material
violation described in the report has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur." 46 If this inquiry results in a determination that "no violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur," the chief legal officer is required
to notify the reporting attorney and provide the basis for the determination. 7
If the chief legal officer is unable to make that determination, then the chief
legal officer is required to "take all reasonable steps to cause the issuer to
adopt an appropriate response and ... advise the reporting attorney [of those
steps]."48
A reporting attorney "who receives what he or she ... believes [to be]
an appropriate and timely response" has fulfilled his or her obligations under
the Part 205 Rules.49 If not, however, the attorney is obligated under the
Rules to report the evidence of a material violation to:
(i) The audit committee of the issuer's board of directors;
(ii) Another committee of the issuer's board of directors consisting
solely of directors who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by
the issuer and are not, in the case of a registered investment
company, "interested persons" as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19)) (if the
issuer's board of directors has no audit committee); or
46. § 205.3(b)(2).
47. Id.
48. Id. "Appropriate response" is defined to mean:
[A] response to an attorney regarding reported evidence of a material violation as a result
of which the attorney reasonably believes:
(1) That no material violation, as defined in paragraph (i) of this section, has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur;
(2) That the issuer has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial measures,
including appropriate steps or sanctions to stop any material violations that are
ongoing, to prevent any material violation that has yet to occur, and to remedy or
otherwise appropriately address any material violation that has already occurred and
to minimize the likelihood of its recurrence; or
(3) That the issuer, with the consent of the issuer's board of directors, a committee
thereof to whom a report could be made pursuant to §205.3(b)(3), or a qualified
legal compliance committee, has retained or directed an attorney to review the
reported evidence of a material violation and either:
(i) Has substantially implemented any remedial recommendations made by
such attorney after a reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported
evidence; or
(ii) Has been advised that such attorney may, consistent with his or her
professional obligations, assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or
the issuer's officer, director, employee, or agent, as the case may be) in any
investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the reported
evidence of a material violation.
§ 205.2(b).
49. § 205.3(b)(8).
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iii) The issuer's board of directors...
The reporting attorney is further obligated to explain to the board or
committee the reasons why he or she believes that the response was not
appropriate.5'
If the issuer has previously established a QLCC and the attorney has
already provided a report of the "evidence of a material violation" to that
committee, the attorney is not required to make the committee or board
report described above.52 The advantage of establishing a QLCC, from the
attorney's perspective, is that the attorney discharges his or her reporting
obligations under the Part 205 Rules by making a report to that committee
and does not have to make a determination of whether he or she has received
an "appropriate response" to it.
5 3
E. Disclosure of Evidence of a Material Violation to the SEC ("Noisy
Withdrawal ")
As originally set forth in the Proposing Release, the Part 205 Rules
would have required an attorney to withdraw from representing the issuer
and, within one business day of withdrawing, to give written notice to the
SEC of the attorney's withdrawal.54 The notice would have had to indicate
that the withdrawal was based on "professional considerations."55  The
withdrawal would have been required if the attorney did not receive an
appropriate response to his or her report of a material violation, and he or
she "reasonably believe[s] that a material violation is ongoing or is about to
occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the issuer or of investors. 56 The Proposing Release would also
have required the attorney promptly to
disaffirm to the [SEC] any opinion, document, affirmation,
representation, characterization, or the like in [any] document filed
with or submitted to the [SEC], or incorporated into such a
document, that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing
50. § 205.3(b)(3). The attorney is obligated to report to the board of directors "if the issuer's
board of directors has no committee consisting solely of directors who are not employed, directly or
indirectly, by the issuer and are not, in the case of a registered investment company, 'interested
persons' as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act of 1940." § 205.3(b)(3)(iii)
(citation omitted).
51. § 205.3(b)(9).
52. § 205.3(c)(1).
53. Id.
54. See Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No.
33,8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,802, at 86,541 (Nov. 21, 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
and that the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially
false or misleading. 7
This "noisy withdrawal" requirement was not adopted by the SEC as
part of the Rules.58 In the Adopting Release, however, the SEC did not
reject that proposed component and instead merely deferred the issue for
further consideration.59  The Commission simultaneously proposed for
comment an alternative "noisy withdrawal" proposal, which would require
the issuer (rather than the attorney) to provide notice to the SEC in a public
filing of an attorney's withdrawal from representation of the issuer.60 The
comment period on the SEC's alternative proposal expired April 7, 2003.61
Three California State Bar committees, including the Corporations
Committee, submitted letters of comment to the SEC opposing adoption of
these additional requirements.62
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 86,519. However, an element of "reporting out" to someone other than the client may
be embedded in the Rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2004). As discussed above, an attorney may
be subject to the Rules even though he or she represents a subsidiary of an issuer and has no
attorney-client relationship (at least insofar as state law is concerned) with the subsidiary's parent.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. To the extent that the Rules are interpreted to require the
attorney to report to the chief legal officer of the parent or the parent's board or audit committee, the
Rules require the attorney to report to someone other than his or her client. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)
(2004). In the Adopting Release, the SEC explains the reporting obligation of an attorney for a
subsidiary as follows:
An attorney who represents a subsidiary or other person controlled by an issuer at the
behest, for the benefit, or on behalf of a parent issuer who becomes aware of evidence of
a material violation that is material to the issuer should report the evidence up-the-ladder
through the issuer, as set forth in Section 205.3(b) of the rule.
Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823, at n.58 (Aug. 5, 2003). In this
regard it should be noted that the interests of the parent and the subsidiary may not be the same, and
could even be in conflict, and that the subsidiary under the SEC's expanded definition of "issuer"
need not be wholly-owned by the parent. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
59. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Chairman William H. Donaldson, Remarks at the Practicing Law
Institute (hereinafter the "PLI Speech") (Nov. 6, 2003) ("The noisy withdrawal rules remain under
consideration today, as does an alternative that would require attorneys to notify the company of
their resignation and the company to report the resignation to the Commission."), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchll0603whd.htm; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Chairman
William H. Donaldson, Testimony Before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs (Sept. 9, 2003) ("The Commission has not decided how it wishes to proceed with respect to
'noisy withdrawal."'), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/0903tswhd.htm.
60. Implementation of Standards of Prof'I Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8186, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 186,824, at 87,117 (Jan. 29, 2003).
61. Id.
62. See Letter from Kevin E Mohr, Chair, Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/copracsbcO4O403.htm; see also Letter from Timothy G Hoxie, Chair,
Business Law Section, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 7, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.govlrules/proposedls74502/tghoxiel.htm; see also Letter from Laura
Lee Blake, Executive Comm. Chair, and Erik J. Olson, Executive Comm. member, Litigation
Section, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lssbc4O403.htm.
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F. Permissive Disclosure of Client Confidences
The final Rules incorporate a provision that permits, but does not
require, an attorney to disclose evidence of a material violation to the SEC
without the issuer's consent.63 Rule 205.3(d)(2) states that an attorney
covered by the Rules may reveal to the SEC:
confidential information related to the representation [of the issuer]
to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a [SEC] investigation or
administrative proceeding from committing perjury, ....
suborning perjury, ... or committing any act proscribed in
[Section 1001 of Title 18] that is likely to perpetrate a fraud
upon the [SEC]; 64 or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the
63. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2004). The Rule permits disclosure without the consent of the
"issuer." See id. However, it does not explicitly permit disclosure without the consent of the client.
See id. As discussed above, an attorney may be appearing and practicing before the SEC in the
representation of an issuer even though he or she is providing legal services to a subsidiary. See
supra notes 39-40, 58 and accompanying text. Because the expanded definition of "issuer" does not
apply to Rule 205.3(d)(2), the rule fails to take into account the situation in which the issuer and the
client are not one and the same. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2004).
64. 18 U.S.C. §1001(a) (2004) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully-
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation;
or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's
counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party
or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection
(a) shall apply only to -
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the
procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support
services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the
Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any
committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with
applicable rules of the House or Senate.
18 U.S.C. §1001(a) (2004).
issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the
furtherance of which the attorney's services were used.65
Note that this permissive disclosure rule permits disclosure of confidential
information even to "rectify the consequences of a material violation [that
occurred in the past] ... that caused ... substantial injury ... in the
furtherance of which the attorney's services were used. ' 66  Disclosure is
therefore permitted even if there is no prospective threat of ongoing or future
substantial injury.67
It is also noteworthy that the permissive disclosure rule allows the
attorney to consider the interests of "investors" and not simply his or her
client.68 It is unclear what investors the SEC intended to cover. The term
might be limited simply to shareholders, but it could include holders of debt
securities or even investors in the securities markets more generally. In each
of these cases, conflicts of interest could exist as between the corporation
and any such investor and there could potentially be numerous combinations
of conflicts as among those investors. Determining which interest is that of
the entity itself or how to balance inconsistent interests would create serious
dilemmas for an attorney subject to the Rules.
G. Good Faith Defense
The SEC's Part 205 Rules state that "[a]n attorney who complies in
good faith with the provisions of [Part 205] shall not be subject to discipline
or otherwise liable under [any] inconsistent standards imposed by any state
... where the attorney is admitted or practices.' ' 69
H. The SEC's Claim of Preemption
The SEC recognized the potential conflict between the duty of attorney-
client confidentiality as mandated under various state attorney regulatory
systems and the invitation in the Part 205 Rules for attorneys to disclose
65. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2004).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii).
67. The word "rectify" means to "make, or set right; remedy; to make good." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1899 (3d. ed. 2002). Thus, the
term should be understood to refer necessarily to past acts. After all, something cannot be put right
if it has not already gone wrong. Nonetheless, the failure to put something right may result in
continuing harm - but this is not inevitably the case.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2004).
69. § 205.6(c). This rule specifically exempts attorneys practicing outside the United States from
complying with Part 205 "to the extent that such compliance is prohibited by applicable foreign
law." id. While the SEC's decision to exempt attorneys practicing outside the United States might
be viewed as a pragmatic response to the realities of international practice, it does represent a
curious bias in favor of foreign legal systems over the legislatures and courts of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia. For example, if an attorney admitted in California is practicing in a foreign
jurisdiction with exactly the same confidentiality obligations as California, the SEC would exempt
the attorney on the basis of the foreign country's rules but not those of California.
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their client's confidential information to the SEC.7° It did so by declaring
that the Rules preempt conflicting state law. Section 205.1 ("Purpose and
Scope") states:
This part sets forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer. These standards supplement applicable
standards of any jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or
practices and are not intended to limit the ability of any jurisdiction
to impose additional obligations on an attorney not inconsistent with
the application of this part. Where the standards of a state or
other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted
or practices conflict with this part, this part shall govern.7'
The SEC acknowledged in the Adopting Release that "[a] number of
commenters questioned the Commission's authority to preempt state ethics
rules, at least without being explicitly authorized and directed to do so by
Congress., 72  On the other hand, it cited another comment letter which
noted:
[T]he Constitution's Commerce Clause grants the federal
government the power to regulate the securities industry, that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the Commission to establish rules
setting forth minimum standards of conduct for attorneys appearing
and practicing before it, and that, under the Supremacy Clause, duly
adopted Commission rules will preempt conflicting state rules.73
The Adopting Release concluded: "[T]he Commission reaffirms that its
rules shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws of a state or other
United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is admitted or practices. 74
Indeed, Section 205.6 ("Sanctions and discipline") states:
(c) An attorney who complies in good faith with the provisions of
this part shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable under
70. § 205.1.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823, at 87,071 (Feb. 5, 2003). The commenters questioning the SEC's
authority to preempt state law included the Corporations Committee, the Litigation Section of the
California State Bar, the Bar Association of San Francisco, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, and the American Bar Association. See infra notes 213-31 and accompanying text.
73. Implementation of Standards of Prof'I Conduct for Attorneys, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823, at 87,071 (Feb. 5, 2003).
74. Id.
105
inconsistent standards imposed by any state or other United States
jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or practices.75
I. The SEC's July 2003 Public Statement
On July 9, 2003, the Ethics 2003 Committee of the Washington State
Bar Association (the "WSBA") submitted a proposed interim formal ethics
opinion for adoption by the WSBA Board of Governors regarding the effect
of the SEC's Part 205 Rules on the obligations of Washington attorneys
under the Washington Supreme Court's Rules of Professional Conduct.76 It
stated that, notwithstanding the permissive disclosure provisions of the
SEC's Rule 205.3(d)(2), a Washington lawyer "should not reveal such
confidences and secrets unless authorized to do so under the [Washington
Rules of Professional Conduct]." 77 The proposed opinion further stated that,
in the absence of case law on the validity of the SEC's professed preemption
of contrary state law, "a Washington attorney cannot ... fairly claim to be
complying in 'good faith' with the SEC Regulations [Part 205].... if (s)he
took an action that was contrary to this Formal Opinion.
78
In response, the SEC authorized issuance of a public statement by its
general counsel, Giovanni P. Prezioso, in the form of a letter to the President
of the WSBA (hereinafter the "Public Statement").79 In the Public
Statement, Mr. Prezioso stated:
The [Supreme] Court has consistently upheld the authority of
federal agencies to implement rules of conduct that diverge from
and supersede state laws that address the same conduct .... In
particular, where, as here, a conflict arises because a state rule
prohibits an attorney from exercising the discretion provided by a
federal regulation, the federal regulation will take priority.80
In the Public Statement, the SEC emphatically supported the preemptive
scope of the Part 205 Rules, and declared its disagreement with the position
75. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2004).
76. See Highlights from the July 9, 2003 meeting 10-11, available at http://www.wsba.org/
lawyers/groups/ethics2003/archivedhighlights.doc. The proposed version of the opinion is no longer
available on the WSBA's website. According to the summary of meetings of the WSBA Ethics
2003 Committee, the final version adopted on July 26, 2003, reflected only"minor revisions" from
the version submitted in proposed form on July 9, 2003. Id. at 9.
77. ETHICS 2003 COMMITTEE OF THE WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, INTERIM FORMAL ETHICS
OPINION, RE: THE EFFECT OF THE SEC'S SARBANES-OXLEY REGULATIONS ON WASHINGTON
ATT1ORNEYS' OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RPCS 1 (2003), available at http://www.wsba.org/
lawyers/groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc.
78. Id.
79. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to J. Richard
Manning, President, Wash. State Bar Ass'n (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch072303gpp.htm.
80. Id. (citations omitted).
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asserted in the proposed Washington ethics opinion.8 Specifically, the
Public Statement made the following three points: 1) Rule 205.3(d)(2),
permitting attorney disclosure of client confidences, supersedes state laws or
rules of conduct that prohibit disclosure of client confidences; 2) under Rule
205.6(c), an attorney complying in good faith with the Commission's
attorney conduct rules, "shall not" be subject to discipline or other liability
under inconsistent state law or rules; and 3) the Part 205 Rules "would also
be frustrated" if the Washington State Bar authorities "initiated" a
disciplinary proceeding against an attorney who complied in "good faith"
with the SEC's Part 205 Rules.82
The third point, that even the "initiation" of a disciplinary proceeding
against an attorney appearing and practicing before the SEC who discloses
client confidences to the SEC would violate the Part 205 Rules, represents
an aggressive assertion of the preemptive scope of the SEC's attorney
conduct rules.83
The SEC's Public Statement generated significant comment. The
Corporations Committee addressed the statement in detail in a letter to Mr.
Prezioso dated August 13, 2003. 84 The Corporations Committee's letter
emphasized the following points. First, California's law and rules of
professional conduct prohibit lawyers from disclosing client confidences. 5
Second, the ability of clients to confer fully with their attorneys without fear
of disclosure is essential to our judicial system.86 Third, disclosure of client
confidences can have serious consequences for both the client and the
attorney.87 Fourth, it is unclear whether the SEC had the authority to adopt
Rules 205.3(d) or 205.6(c) or that either of those rules preempts state laws
and rules. 8 Finally, the State Bar of California has no power to refuse to
enforce California statutes on the basis of federal preemption unless an
appellate court has so ruled.89
Notwithstanding the SEC's Public Statement, the Board of Governors of
the WSBA adopted the interim ethical rule by an 11-0 vote (with one
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. Because the question of an attorney's "good faith" in complying with Rule
205.3(d)(2) could only be established after a hearing to determine good faith (it would be a rare
attorney who would concede lack of good faith before such a hearing), the effect of this view of
preemption would be to prohibit all disciplinary hearings against attorneys disclosing client
confidences based upon the SEC's Part 205 Rules, whether the disclosure was made in good faith or
not.
84. Letter from the Corp. Comm. to Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Aug. 13, 2003) (on file with author).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
abstention). 90  In a letter to Mr. Giovanni Prezioso, the President of the
Washington Bar Association explained Washington's position as follows:
It remains to be seen whether the Washington Supreme Court will
adopt rules of professional responsibility in greater conformity with
the ABA model rules, or whether Washington will continue to
require greater protection of client confidences than is mandated in
some states. However, in the interim, and until our Supreme Court
or a higher court has directed otherwise, Washington lawyers must
continue to observe their ethical obligations under the Washington
Rules of Professional Responsibility. This includes continuing to
protect client confidences as required by Washington RPC 1.6. 9'
In a speech to the ABA Section of Business Law on April 3, 2004, Mr.
Prezioso defended the permissive reporting out rule, and confirmed: "[lIt is
our view that, where a federal rule says you may do something and a state
rule says you may not, there is a conflict and the federal rule should
prevail. '92 He invited lawyers to provide the SEC with a test case:
I would urge any lawyer who would like to make a disclosure under
the Commission's rules, but who is concerned about a potential
conflict with state bar rules to consult with us, either directly or
through counsel. We on the staff would appreciate the opportunity
to work with a lawyer facing such a conflict, either in addressing the
issues before state bar authorities or, if necessary in court.
9 3
90. Highlights From August 13, 2003 Meeting 9-10, available at http://www.wsba.orgflawyers/
groups/ethics2003/archivedhighlights.doc. The text of the final interim ethics opinion as thus
adopted by the WSBA Board of Governors is available at http://www.wsba.orglawyers/groups/
ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (noting that it is "interim" in view of the absence of case law and of
pending proposals to revise Rule 1.6 of the WSBA Rules of Professional Conduct).
91. Letter from 1. Richard Manning, President, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, to Giovanni Prezioso,
General Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 11, 2003), available at http://www.wsba.org/
lawyers/groups/ethics2003/manninglettertosec.doc.
92. Giovanni P. Prezioso, Remarks at the ABA Section of Bus. Law 2004 Spring Meeting (Apr.
3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch04O304gpp.htm.
93. Id. There is some irony in the General Counsel of the SEC suggesting that the protections
afforded by acting through an attorney be utilized to undermine one of those same protections -
confidentiality. More importantly, the SEC's active encouragement of violations of Section 6068(e)
in reliance on the SEC's rules could result in violations by SEC attorneys of California's Rules of
Professional Conduct as well as the local rules of the federal district courts in California (which have
adopted California's State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct). See infra note 191.
California lawyers may not "knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce any [violation of the] rules or the
State Bar Act," including Section 6068(e). CAL. RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 1-120. Thus, if it
should turn out that either the SEC's claim of preemption is not sustained or that under the facts of a
particular case the safe harbor is not available, SEC attorneys might be exposed to discipline to the
extent they are either members of the California Bar or appearing in the federal courts in California.
The Corporations Committee drew this matter to the attention of Mr. William Lenox in a letter dated
April 30, 2004, on the occasion of his appointment as head of the Ethics Office of the SEC. Letter
from the Corp. Comm. to William Lenox, Ethics Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (April 30, 2004),
available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/ 20 0 4 -04 -30-Crp-
ComLetter-to-Wm-Lenox.pdf.
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II. THE OBLIGATION OF CALIFORNIA ATrORNEYS TO MAINTAIN CLIENT
CONFIDENCES
A. The Statutory Obligation: Its Justifications and Countervailing Policies
Attorney-client confidentiality has been a core and universally
recognized value of Anglo-American jurisprudence for hundreds of years.94
The duty of confidentiality for California lawyers is set forth in Business and
Professions Code Section 6068(e), which states: "It is the duty of an
attorney... [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." 95  This
statutory duty was first codified in California more than 130 years ago.
California has been among the most zealous states in guarding and
94. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The attorney-client privilege is the
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law."); Mitchell v.
Super. Ct., 691 P.2d 642, 645 (Cal. 1984) ("The attorney-client privilege has been a hallmark of
Anglo-American jurisprudence for almost 400 years."); In re Jordan, 526 P.2d 523, 526 (Cal. 1974)
("[T]he protection of confidences and secrets is not a rule of mere professional conduct, but instead
involves public policies of paramount importance which are reflected in numerous statutes.")
(quoting In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873, 879 (Cal. 1972)).
95. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2004). It should be noted that Section 6068(e) is
comprised of two parts. The first part requires an attorney to maintain inviolate the "confidence" of
his or her client. Id. The second part requires the attorney to preserve his or her client's "secrets."
Id. It is possible that these two parts of the statute mean the same thing. This interpretation would
assign the same meanings to "confidence" and "secrets." One might justify this interpretation by
arguing that the redundancy simply reflects the legislature's intent to underscore the importance of
the obligation. It is also possible that Section 6068(e) could be read to impose different, but related
obligations. "Confidence" can also refer to "firm trust" or faith in someone. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 294 (7th ed. 1999). Assigning this meaning to confidence would give a different
meaning to the first part of Section 6068(e) - imposing a duty on attorneys to maintain their clients'
full trust. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6068(e). This implies a broader obligation that includes not
only a duty to keep the client's secrets but also a duty to refrain from conflicts of interest. Sir
Francis Bacon eloquently pointed out the relationship between trust and confidentiality:
The greatest trust, between man and man, is the trust of giving counsel. For in other
confidences, men commit the parts of life; their lands; their goods, their children, their
credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counselors, they commit the
whole: by how much the more, they are obliged to all faith and integrity.
FRANCIS BACON, A HARMONY OF THE ESSAYS 310-11 (Edward Arber ed., Kings College
1871) (1610) (altered from Old English version).
Advocates of this interpretation can point to the fact that "confidence" is singular in the statute
while "secrets" is plural. § 6068(e). Had the legislature intended to use "confidence" as the
equivalent of a "secret," one would expect that the plural form would have been used. If Section
6068(e) embraces two duties, it should be noted that the duty of confidentiality requires more of the
attorney since that is a duty that he or she must maintain at his or her every peril.
For convenience, this article uses the "duty of confidentiality" and like terms to refer to the
statutory obligation of an attorney to maintain the confidentiality of his or her client's secrets. This
usage, however, should not be considered to derogate an interpretation of Section 6068(e) that
imposes a broader duty to maintain the confidence of the client.
protecting client confidences and secrets.96  There were no express
exceptions to this statutory duty until July 1, 2004. 97 On that date, an
amendment to Section 6068(e) took effect permitting an attorney to disclose
confidential information when the attorney reasonably believes that
disclosure of a client secret is necessary to prevent a criminal act reasonably
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. 98
The insistence that a lawyer preserve the secrets of his client is most
commonly justified on the grounds that it is necessary to the client in
obtaining good legal advice. 99 A client cannot reasonably be expected to lay
the full facts of his or her case before counsel if the client knows that, by
doing so, he or she may well be creating evidence that could be used against
him or her. When full and frank discussion is curbed, legal counsel will not
have sufficient information to be able to provide the right advice or defend
the client adequately. Thus, client confidentiality is essential to the effective
assistance of counsel and, ultimately, to due process of law.
The public interest is also served through increased compliance with the
law when clients receive competent legal advice.'0° Maintaining client
confidentiality is further justified on the basis that it is necessary to prevent
conflicts of interest between the attorney and the client. Absent the
obligation of confidentiality, an attorney might be tempted to reveal a
client's secrets in furtherance of the attorney's own interests. 0' Finally,
secrets can represent the property of the client, and their revelation can
effectively destroy the value of the client's property. 0 2 After all, a secret is
96. See Kevin Mohr, California's Duty of Confidentiality: Is it Time for a Life-Threatening
Criminal Act Exception?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 307, 309 (2002).
97. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(2) (Deering Supp. 2004).
98. Id. Assembly Bill 1101 amended Section 6068(e)(2) which provides:
[Ain attorney may, but is not required to, reveal confidential information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent that the attorney reasonably believes the disclosure
is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the attorney reasonably believes is likely to
result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
A.B. 1101, 2003-04, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
This change resulted in the pre-existing text being numbered as clause (1) and adding the
exception as a new clause (2). Id. AB 1101 also amended Evidence Code Section 956.5, which
provides for a similar exception to the attorney-client privilege, to conform its language to the new
Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e)(2). Id. The California Supreme Court adopted
California Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-100, to specify the conditions under which a
California lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal confidential information pursuant to Section
6068(e)(2). Rule 3-100 took effect on July 1, 2004. See Cal. Sup. Ct. Order No. 125414 (June 24,
2004).
99. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Super. Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984) (explaining that the
"fundamental purpose" furthered by the privilege is "the right of every person to freely and fully
confer and confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the
former may have adequate advice and a proper defense") (citation omitted).
100. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1981) (describing how the
certainty of the privilege enables clients to seek advice on how to obey the law).
101. For example, Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz recently criticized the
attorneys who defended the well-known businesswoman Martha Stewart. Alan M. Dershowitz, Was
Stewart's Dream Team a Nightmare?, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at B 13. He alleges that client
confidences apparently were leaked in an effort to preserve the attorneys' reputation after Ms.
Stewart's conviction. Id.
102. The law recognizes the independent, economic value of secrets. For example, California has
110
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only a secret until it is disclosed. In this sense, any law or rule that permits
revelation of a client's secret also authorizes the taking of the client's
property.
Counterpoised against these justifications for preserving secrets is a
societal interest in full disclosure. In the courtroom, society has an interest
in ensuring that judges and juries have access to all relevant facts."°3 Law
enforcement will arguably be more effective in detecting and preventing
crimes when secrecy is not protected and there are no sanctions for revealing
secrets. 1°4 In the commercial sphere, disclosure of secrets helps buyers and
sellers decide whether they want to do business and whether the price is
appropriate. 10 5 It has also been argued that public companies have less of a
"moral claim" to protection. 106
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1-. I (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
Non-commercial secrets also have value to clients and this value is recognized in the tort law of
privacy and criminal sanctions for blackmail. It seems the use of the term "secrets" in Section
6068(e) should be understood to embrace all of these different types of secrets. See generally CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003).
103. See In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976)
(recognizing that the goals of the criminal justice system require "that every relevant fact be
developed and presented to the fact-finder").
104. This interest is advanced by statutes that protect so-called "whistleblowers" who "blow the
whistle" by revealing the secrets of others. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2004)
(prohibiting publicly traded companies from "discharg[ing], demot[ing], suspend[ing], threaten[ing],
harass[ing], or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and conditions
of employment" because the employee has engaged in specified whistle blowing activities); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West Supp. 2004) (prohibiting employers from, among other things, retaliating
against an employee "for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, where
the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or
federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation"). In some
cases, disclosure is even mandated. For example, the recently enacted California Disclosure Act
imposes million-dollar fines on issuers organized in California that fail to report specified misdeeds
to the Attorney General or the appropriate regulator. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2207, 17655 (West Supp.
2004). See Keith Paul Bishop, California Legislature Tells Sarbanes-Oxley Issuers to Confess or
Else, 18 INSIGHTS 30 (2004). However, fear of exposure may cause clients to forego legal advice
that, if obtained, would promote compliance. California Governor Schwarzenegger recently voiced
this concern in vetoing AB 2713, a bill that would have provided an exception to Section 6068(e) for
government lawyers: "This bill will ensure that advice is not conveyed in every situation and
therefore it is too broad to affect [sic] the intended purposes." Press Release, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, AB 2713 Veto Message (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/
govsite/pdf/vetoes/AB_2713_veto.pdf.
105. Pro-disclosure policies are most obviously reflected in laws and rules requiring full
disclosure in the context of securities transactions. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 1977).
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or offer to buy a
security in this state by means of any written or oral communication which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.
Id.
106. Cramton et al., supra note 27, at 815.
B. California's Historic Emphasis on Confidentiality
The California courts have been unambiguous in their support of an
attorney's duty to maintain client confidences. For example, the California
Supreme Court has said, "While it is perhaps somewhat of a hyperbole to
refer to the attorney-client privilege as 'sacred,' it is clearly one which our
judicial system has carefully safeguarded with only a few specific
exceptions."' 0 7 In a later decision, the Supreme Court declared, "Protecting
the confidentiality of communications between attorney and client is
fundamental to our legal system."'0 8 The comments of Presiding Court of
Appeal Justice Shinn in a much earlier opinion also underscore the heavy
burden of the attorney's obligation to maintain his or her client's
confidences:
The privilege of confidential communication between client and
attorney should be regarded as sacred. It is not to be whittled away
by means of specious argument that it has been waived. Least of all
should the courts seize upon slight and equivocal circumstances as a
technical reason for destroying the privilege. Here the attorney was
compelled to testify against his client under threat of punishment for
contempt. Such procedure would have been justified only in case
the defendant with knowledge of his rights had waived the privilege
in open court or by his statements and conduct had furnished
explicit and convincing evidence that he did not understand, desire
or expect that his statements to his attorney would be kept in
confidence. Defendant's attorney should have chosen to go to jail
and take his chances of release by a higher court. 9
California attorneys have also historically supported California's
insistence on maintaining client confidences. In 1983, during debates at the
American Bar Association House of Delegates concerning adoption of the
ABA Model Rules, representatives of California bar organizations opposed a
proposal to permit attorneys to voluntarily reveal confidential information to
prevent a client from committing fraud." °  As a compromise, the ABA
included in the comments to Model Rule 1.6 permission for a lawyer who
believes his or her services have been used in furtherance of fraud to stage a
so-called "noisy withdrawal" by publicly disavowing documents the lawyer
prepared."' In the late 1990's, when the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission
107. Mitchell v. Super. Ct., 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984).
108. People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. Speedee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378 (Cal.
1999) (quoted with approval in People v. Super. Ct., 23 P.3d 563, 571 (Cal. 2001)).
109. People v. Kor, 277 P.2d 94, 100-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (concurring opinion) (emphasis
added). It is worth noting that the third Justice on the panel concurred in the opinion of the court and
in the judgment (as did Justice Shinn) but also specifically concurred in the comments of Justice
Shinn. Id. (Valde, J., concurring). The final observation of Justice Shinn reverberates today: "This
is not intended as a criticism of the action of the attorney. It is, however, a suggestion to any and all
attorneys who may have the misfortune to be confronted by the same or a similar problem." Id.
110. The State Bar of California Annual Report, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Dec. 1983, at 59, 60-61.
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6, cmt. (1983) ("Neither this Rule nor Rule
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studied the Model Rules to make recommendations for updating and
revising them, Californians again stood front and center in opposing
exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality.'
1 2
That opposition also prevailed in 2001, when the ABA House of
Delegates voted to reject additional exceptions to confidentiality that would
permit a lawyer to make disclosures to prevent or rectify fraud.'13  In the
face of subsequent, high-profile corporate scandals, ABA President Robert
Hirshon appointed a task force to examine, among other things, the ethical
responsibilities of lawyers. 14  The task force proposed rule amendments
permitting a lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer believes necessary to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that would lead to "substantial injury to the
1.8(b) [regarding use of confidential information to the client's disadvantage] nor Rule 1.16(d)
[regarding withdrawal from the representation] prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or
the like."). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 14 (2003).
112. See, e.g., Letter from Demitrious Dimitriou, Richard Flamm, and Mark L. Tuft, Bar Ass'n of
San Francisco, to Nancy J. Moore, Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Evaluation of Rules of Prof'I
Conduct (January 26, 1999) ("It is difficult for this Association to conceive how a lawyer could
properly present [sic] a client and at the same time act as provided in proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) or (3)
consistent with the lawyer's duties of loyalty and competence."), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/tuft.html; Letter from Harry B. Sondheim, Chair, State Bar of
California's Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, to Susan Campbell, Comm'n on
the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct (Jan. 13, 1999) ("We urge the Commission not to
focus undue attention on the relatively few instances where clients misuse confidentiality."),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cprle2klselegue.html.
113. Although the Delegates approved a modification to the Model Rules, which would permit
disclosure to prevent "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," they defeated a
modification which also would have permitted disclosure to prevent a client from using the lawyer's
services to commit a fraud. A similar proposal which would have permitted disclosure to mitigate
financial losses was withdrawn. See Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyers May Reveal Secrets Of Clients,
Bar Group Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001, at A12; see also Sarah Boxer, Lawyers Are Asking,
How Secret is a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at B7. One California newspaper quoted an
opponent of the proposals as stating they would "turn the lawyer into a stealth informant against the
client." See Henry Weinstein, The Nation: ABA Votes to Ease Client Secrets Rule, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2001, at A8.
114. ABA President Robert Hirshon gave the task force the following charge:
[T]he Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, shall examine systemic issues relating to
corporate responsibility arising out of the unexpected and traumatic bankruptcy of Enron
and other Enron-like situations which have shaken confidence in the effectiveness of the
governance and disclosure systems applicable to public companies in the United States.
The Task Force will examine the framework of laws and regulations and ethical
principles governing the roles of lawyers, executive officers, directors, and other key
participants. The issues will be studied in the context of the system of checks and
balances designed to enhance the public trust in corporate integrity and responsibility.
The Task Force will allow the ABA to contribute its perspectives to the dialogue now
occurring among regulators, legislators, major financial markets and other organizations
focusing on legislative and regulatory reform to improve corporate responsibility.
Robert Hirshen, Mission Statement, ABA Presidential Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
(2002) at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsiblity/mission-statement.htmi.
113
financial interests or property of another."'' 5 In August 2003, the ABA's
House of Delegates narrowly approved the task force's recommendations.' 16
California's amendment of Section 6068(e) in August 2003 through
enactment of AB 1101, which created a narrow exception to the obligation
to maintain client confidences, is noteworthy when considered in light of the
SEC's adoption of the Part 205 Rules in November 2002 and the ABA's
amendment of its rules in August 2003.117 Even more recently, the
California Supreme Court adopted Rule 3-100 which expressly prohibits the
disclosure of information protected by Section 6068(e)(1) except in the
narrow circumstance permitted by Section 6068(e)(2) and then only if
specified conditions are satisfied."8
California's strong adherence to the principles of confidentiality in the
attorney-client relationship is illustrated by the case of Cindy Ossias, a
government attorney who revealed wrongdoing by an elected official." 9
Ms. Ossias was the attorney in the California Department of Insurance who
testified before the Assembly Insurance Committee that then Insurance
Commissioner Charles Quackenbush allegedly had disregarded
recommendations from a team of lawyers within the department that he levy
substantial fines against insurance companies whose claims-handling
activities following the Northridge earthquake had violated the law. 120
Instead, Commissioner Quackenbush had directed the insurance companies
to contribute millions of dollars to foundations he had created, with
foundation funds then being used to finance television commercials in which
the Commissioner appeared and to "provide contracts for his political
115. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004). COPRAC again opposed the task force's
recommendations and testified that
[w]hile the proposed changes to Rule 1.6 would do nothing to solve the problems the
Task Force is studying, those changes would have the seriously adverse effect of
undermining the core function of a lawyer to counsel and advise his or her client -
whether that client be a private or governmental entity, or an individual.
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Testimony to the American Bar Association
Corporate Responsibility Task Force 2 (November 11, 2002) (on file with author).
116. The House of Delegates passed the amendment by a vote of 218 to 201. ABA House of
Delegates Reports, Annual Meeting (August 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/nabe/
delegl I html. At the same time, the House of Delegates also approved by a vote of 239 to 147 a
change to Model Rule 1.13 to permit a lawyer representing an organization to reveal a client's
confidences after reporting up if the lawyer reasonably believes that a violation is "reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the organization." Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.13 (2004).
117. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003), with MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003), and 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2002). AB 1101 was also enacted after the California
Attorney General issued an opinion stating that California's whistleblower protection statutes do not
supersede the attorney-client privilege. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
118. Cal. Sup. Ct. Order No. 125414 (June 24, 2004).
119. See Virginia Ellis & Carl Ingram, Whistle-Blower Emerges in Quackenbush Probe, L.A.
TIMES, June 23, 2000, at Al.
120. Id.
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advisors."' 2' Ms. Ossias also testified that she and other attorneys in the
office had been instructed to shred documents.
122
In response to Ms. Ossias's revelations, the State Bar opened an
investigation into whether Ms. Ossias violated her duty of confidentiality.
123
The State Bar closed the investigation without bringing charges, noting that
Commissioner Quackenbush's successor had ratified Ms. Ossias's conduct
and had reinstated her employment, and that Ms. Ossias's conduct was
consistent with the spirit of the Whistleblower Protection Act and advancedimportant public policy considerations.' 24 The State Bar's decision was
consistent with its tradition of exercising discretion over whether to press
charges in light of the particular nature of a case. In other matters involving
disclosure of client information, however, the State Bar has sought to impose
discipline.1
25
Closure of the State Bar investigation did not answer the question,
however, of whether there is a whistleblower exception to Section 6068(e).
In a subsequent legal opinion requested by Assemblymember Darrell
Steinberg, the author of the 2003 amendment to Section 6068(e), the
California Attorney General concluded:
1. The whistle-blower statutory protections applicable to employees
of state and local public entities do not supersede the statutes and
rules governing the attorney-client privilege.
2. The statutory provisions relating to the disclosure of false claims
actions, communications with the Legislature, and the filing of
complaints or claims or the institution of proceedings pertaining to
the rights of employment by employees of state and local public
entities do not supersede the statutes and rules governing the
attorney-client privilege.
126
Although the Attorney General's conclusion referred to the attorney-client
privilege, the opinion discussed Business and Professions Code Section
6068(e). 12 7
121. Id.; Mike McKee, A Secret From Client is Inviolate, THE RECORDER, June 7, 2001, at 1.
122. Virginia Ellis & Miguel Bustillo, Quackenbush Hearings Take Dramatic Turn, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 2000, at Al.
123. Id.
124. Letter from Donald Steedman, Deputy Trial Counsel, State Bar of California, to Richard A.
Zitrin, Attorney for Cindy Ossias (Oct. 11, 2000). See State Bar Exonerates Quackenbush
Whistleblower, CAL. B.J., Jan. 2001, at 24, 30.
125. See, e.g., Dixon v. State Bar, 653 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1982) and In re Matter of Johnson, 4
Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190 (Rev. Dep't 2000).
126. 84 Op. Att'y Gen. 71,71(2001).
127. See id. at 72-74. The attorney-client privilege is a privilege established by the Evidence
Code. See Cal Evid. Code § 954 (West 1995); see also infra note 134 and accompanying text.
After the Attorney General's opinion was issued, Assemblymember
Steinberg introduced a bill, AB 363, which as enrolled would have
authorized attorneys representing governmental organizations to report up
and out.128 In response to the introduction of AB 363, COPRAC prepared
proposed amendments to Rule 3-600.129 After the Supreme Court declined
to adopt the rule changes, the Legislature passed AB 363.130
Nonetheless, Governor Gray Davis vetoed the bill on October 1,
2002.131 In his veto message, the Governor cited concern for the weakening
of the attorney-client privilege: "While this bill is well intended, it chips
away at the attorney-client relationship which is intended to foster candor
between an attorney and client. It is critical that clients know they can
disclose in confidence so they can receive appropriate advice from
counsel.'
132
The net result of these legislative and rulemaking efforts is that there has
been no statutory or rule change that allows California attorneys to "blow
the whistle" outside the narrow exception created by Section 6068(e)(2) and
Rule 3-100 for disclosure of client secrets to prevent bodily injury or
death. 1
33
C. The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It
Authorize Unilateral Breach by an Attorney of the Duty of
Confidentiality?
The Evidence Code imposes an independent statutory requirement on
attorneys to claim the attorney-client privilege whenever disclosure of an
attorney-client communication is sought to be disclosed. 14 This obligation,
known as the attorney-client privilege, is susceptible to being conflated with
an attorney's obligations under Section 6068(e). 135 The apparent similarity
of these statutory obligations raises the question of whether the statutory
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege should be applied to Section
128. Charles S. Doskow, The Government Attorney and the Right to Blow the Whistle: The Cindy
Ossias Case and Its Aftermath (A Two Year Journey to Nowhere), 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 21, 37-38
(Fall 2003).
129. See Nancy McCarthy, Rule Change Proposed to Protect Government Whistleblowers, CAL.
ST. B.J., March 2002, at 14.
130. See Assembly Floor Analysis (August 28, 2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
01 -02/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_363_cfa_20021008_170624 asmjfloor.html.
131. Press Release, Governor Gray Davis, AB 363 Veto Message (Oct. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsite/msdocs/pressrelease/L02 250_AB_363-veto-message.doc.
132. Id. A similar bill, AB 2713, was passed by the California legislature in 2004 and was also
vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger with a message that it "would condone violations of the
attorney-client privilege, which is the cornerstone of our legal system." Press Release, supra note
104. It also raised concerns that the bill would dissuade government officials from obtaining legal
advice. Id.
133. See generally Doskow, supra note 128, at 21.
134. CAL. EVID. CODE § 955 (West 2004).
135. Compare CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 955-62 (West 2004), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)
(West 2003). See also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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6068(e) even though those exceptions are not mirrored in the Business and
Professions Code.
The position that the statutory exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege, including the so-called crime-fraud exception, apply to Section
6068(e) is supported by the obvious similarities between the attorney's
obligation to assert the privilege and his or her duty to keep secret a client's
secret. Case law also exists that can be interpreted to support that
position. 136 However, that same case law may also be read in tandem with
other developments in the law of California confidentiality to reject such an
expansive view. 137
There is no question that the attorney-client privilege has much in
common with the duties established by Section 6068(e). They share the
same basic policy rationale: to ensure that every person is free to trust,
confide in, and disclose all pertinent information to, an attorney and thereby
obtain effective legal advice and representation. 138 By promoting the open
and candid exchange of information, the attorney's duty under Section
6068(e) and the evidentiary privilege foster not only the proffering of sound
legal advice and representation, but also compliance with the law as well.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States,
the evidentiary privilege "encourage[s] full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. '' 139 For its
part, the California Supreme Court has recognized that "the benefits derived
[from the privilege] justify the risk that unjust decisions may sometimes
result from the suppression of relevant evidence." 4° Thus, while the courts
recognize the risks of potential injustice created by the mantle of
confidentiality, they have repeatedly emphasized that the benefits derived -
creation of an environment in which clients are forthright, the dispensation
of useful advice, and increased observance of the law - outweigh those
risks. 41
Despite the similar policies supported by the duty to maintain client
secrets and the evidentiary privilege, they are two distinct rules with
important differences. These differences militate against any attempt to
graft the statutory exceptions applicable to one onto the other.
First, these obligations are codified in different places. The statutory
duty of confidentiality is established by the Business and Professions Code,
136. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 141-83 and accompanying text.
138. See People ex rel Dep't of Corps. v. Speedee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378-79
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999); California State Bar Ethics Opinion 2003-161, available at http://calbar.ca.
gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/OPN_2003_ 16i .pdf.
139. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (emphasis added).
140. City & County of San Francisco v. Super. Ct., 231 P.2d 26, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
141. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
while the attorney-client privilege is codified in the Evidence Code. 142 It
cannot be assumed that the Legislature intended for exceptions expressed in
one statute to apply to entirely different statutes. Indeed, when the
Legislature enacted AB 1101 in 2003 it created exceptions in both codes.
The clear implication of this absence of parallelism between the two codes is
that exceptions should not be carried inevitably from one code to the other.
Second, the attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary privilege that
applies when a lawyer is legally compelled to speak, such as through
subpoena. In contrast, the duty of confidentiality is a professional obligation
that applies to the lawyer at all times, not just when the lawyer is testifying
in court or pursuant to a subpoena.
143
Third, the scope of the attorney-client privilege is narrower than the
duty of confidentiality. The attorney-client privilege applies only to
"confidential communication[s] between client and lawyer," which are
defined to be:
[I]nformation transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in
the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which,
so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interest of
the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted,
and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the
lawyer in the course of that relationship.'"
The duty of confidentiality, by contrast, is substantially broader in its
coverage. It protects from disclosure by the attorney any information gained
in the course of the professional relationship, whether or not received from
the client, that may be embarrassing or detrimental to the client or which the
client has asked remain confidential. 145  For example, the California
Supreme Court has disciplined an attorney for violating Section 6068(e)
when he disclosed in a declaration his client's concern that her husband had
carried on an affair with her sister.
146
142. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 955 (West 2004); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003).
143. The discussion accompanying Rule 3-100 makes this distinction:
The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other
proceedings in which a member may be called as a witness or be otherwise compelled to
produce evidence concerning a client. A member's ethical duty of confidentiality is not
so limited in its scope of protection for the client-lawyer relationship of trust and prevents
the member from revealing the client's confidential information even when not
confronted with such compulsion.
Cal. Sup. Ct. Order No. 125414 (June 24, 2004). See Mohr, supra note 96, at 319.
144. CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 2003).
145. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Formal Opinions 1993-133, 1988-96 & 1986-87, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/html_unclassified/ca93-133.html; http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/
html..unclassified/ca88-96.html; http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/html_unclassified/ca86-87.html; see also
Mohr, supra note 96, at 319.
146. Dixon v. State Bar, 653 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
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Of course, the application of the privilege reduces the available pool of
evidence and, thus, may interfere with the truth-seeking function of trial.
Thus, the attorney-client privilege is not only narrowly construed, 147 but also
over time it has been subject to numerous statutory exceptions that reflect a
balancing between the policies of encouraging client candor and ensuring
the integrity of the legal system. 4 8  For instance, there is no privilege
concerning communications that were revealed to third parties or to
communications relevant to an issue of breach, by lawyer or client, of a duty
arising out of the attorney-client relationship. 149 Significantly, there is no
privilege if the services of the lawyer were "sought or obtained to enable or
aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud."' 15  The
existence of this exception to the privilege raises the issue that has
confronted several courts: does the crime-fraud exception also constitute an
exception to the duty of confidentiality, thus permitting attorneys
unilaterally to disclose information about a client's crime or fraud to third
parties? The answer is unclear, but what is clear is that an attorney cannot
assume that an exception to the attorney-client privilege will necessarily
excuse the attorney from his or her obligations to keep his or her client's
secrets.
Evidence Code Section 956.5 had provided an exception to the attorney-
client privilege permitting a lawyer to disclose confidential information as
necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believed would be likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm. 15' This exception made little sense as an exception to the privilege,
because rarely would a lawyer, faced with knowledge of a future criminal
act by his or her client, happen to be testifying at a time when revelation of
the potential future act could prevent injury to third parties. Thus, it might
be supposed that the Legislature intended Section 956.5 to be an exception
to the duty of confidentiality. The placement of the statutory language in the
Evidence Code, however, meant that Section 6068(e) remained by its terms
"absolute," that is, subject to no express exception. That has caused
confusion for both courts and commentators alike. 52
147. Mohr, supra note 96, at 341.
148. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956-962 (2004).
149. Id. §§912(A), 958.
150. Id. § 956. This so-called "crime-fraud" exception is quite limited. A client who simply
communicates a plan to commit a crime or fraud is still protected. The exception applies only when
the client seeks legal assistance to plan or perpetrate a crime or fraud. People v. Clark, 789 P.2d
127, 152-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
151. CAL. EvID. CODE § 956.5 (2004). With the enactment of AB 1101, which permits a lawyer
to disclose confidential information to prevent any criminal act (not just a client's criminal act)
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, § 956.5 has also been amended to apply to any
criminal act. Id.
152. Commentators were split on the effect of Section 956.5. See Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege
and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 367 (1995) (concluding that a lawyer who
119
Recently, the Legislature resolved this confusion by enacting an express
exception to Section 6068(e), similar to the exception in Section 956.5. The
legislative history of AB 1101, the bill that accomplished this change,
includes the following author's statement: "Evidence Code section 956.5
does not create an exception to an attorney's duty of confidentiality. Thus
an attorney is still subject to State Bar discipline for disclosing a client's
threats of death or serious bodily injury - even when the attorney believes
that those threats will be acted on." 153 Thus, the bill's author appears to have
recognized a need to clarify the law even though case law suggested that the
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege could be applied to the duty of
confidentiality.154 The Legislature amended Business and Professions Code
Section 6068(e) to provide an express exception to the duty of
confidentiality in the face of a pre-existing and similar exception to privilege
set forth in the Evidence Code. This action can be interpreted to suggest that
exceptions to the privilege, including the "crime-fraud" exception, do not
automatically apply to the duty of confidentiality.
55
Despite the inferences that can be drawn from the Legislature's
enactment of AB 1101, some reported cases can be read to suggest that the
courts have expanded exceptions to the attorney-client privilege so that they
also constitute exceptions to the attorney's fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
For example, in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, a corporation's
in-house attorney sued his employer for, among other things, retaliatory
discharge. 56 The employer contended that the lawsuit could not proceed
due to the client's absolute right to discharge the attorney at any time for any
reason and because allowing such suits to proceed would impair client
confidentiality. 57  The court disagreed, reconciling the duties in-house
attorneys owe to their employer/clients with the right of employees to sue
for retaliatory discharge. 58 The court decided that an in-house attorney may
sue for retaliatory discharge when (i) the "claims [are] founded on
allegations that an in-house attorney was terminated for refusing to violate a
mandatory ethical duty embodied in the Rules of Professional Conduct"'5 9
and (ii) "in-house counsel's nonattorney colleagues would be permitted to
disclosed confidential information in reliance on Section 956.5 would still be subject to discipline).
But see Mohr, supra note 96, at 350 (concluding that attorneys simply could not be sure and arguing
for a definitive statement from the California Supreme Court or the Legislature).
153. Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Committee Analysis re AB 1101 (Cal. July 1, 2003).
154. Compare id. (stating that "Evidence Code section 956.5 does not create an exception to an
attorney's duty of confidentiality"), with People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply "when a client seeks or obtains legal
assistance 'to enable or aid' one to commit a crime or fraud").
155. The discussion to rule 3-100 is non-committal, stating, "Rule 3-100 is not intended to
augment, diminish, or preclude reliance upon, any other exceptions to the duty to preserve the
confidentiality of client information recognized under California law." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3-100 (2001).
156. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
157. See generally id.
158. Id. at 505.
159. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
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pursue a retaliatory discharge claim and governing professional rules or
statutes expressly remove the requirement of attorney confidentiality."'160
The California Supreme Court found more challenging a situation in
which an in-house attorney had been subjected to retaliation based on the
attorney's decision to engage in conduct that was not ethically or legally
mandated but was merely permissible.' 6' Under these circumstances, the
Court ruled that:
[A] court must resolve two questions: First, whether the employer's
conduct is of the kind that would give rise to a retaliatory discharge
action by a nonattorney employee under Gantt v. Sentry Insurance
[citation omitted] and related cases; second, the court must
determine whether some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege codified in the Evidence
Code [§§ 956-58] specifically permits the attorney to depart from
the usual requirement of confidentiality with respect to the client-
employer and engage in the "nonfiduciary" conduct for which he
was terminated. 162
The court noted:
Although their revelation [of attorney-client communications] in the
course of a retaliatory discharge suit may do lasting damage to the
expectations of the corporate client (or, more likely, a corporate
executive) that disclosures to counsel would remain inviolate, a
concern for protecting the fiduciary aspects of the relationship in
the case of a client who confides in counsel for the purpose of
planning a crime or practicing a fraud is misplaced; such
disclosures do not violate the privilege. 
163
This broad statement, with its emphasis on the "misplaced" concern for
protecting the attorney-client relationship when a client confides in a lawyer
to plan a crime or fraud, could reasonably be read to represent a statement by
the California Supreme Court that clients should not expect confidentiality
when seeking to use their attorneys in their criminal or fraudulent plans.
64
It would follow from the court's citation to statutory exceptions to the
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 503.
162. Id. (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
164. In fact, the California Supreme Court preceded that statement by noting:
Matters involving the commission of a crime or a fraud, or circumstances in which the
attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent the commission of a
criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, are statutory and well-
recognized exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.
id. (providing further support for such a broad reading).
privilege (Evidence Code Sections 956-58), that the court was signaling to
lawyers that they could import the exceptions to the privilege into Business
and Professions Code Section 6068(e)'s rule of confidentiality.
General Dynamics is, however, equally susceptible to a narrower
reading that is arguably more consistent with the specific facts and
circumstances of a retaliatory discharge action. First, the General Dynamics
court emphasized the responsibility of the trial judge in a retaliatory
discharge action to take "an aggressive managerial role" to protect the
employer/client's "legitimate privilege interests" by employing sealing and
protective orders, and the like.1 65 Thus, the California Supreme Court may
have envisioned a court's close management of the employee's testimony
and evidence as an added layer of protection to legitimate client confidences
that would not be present where an employee, believing the privilege's
exceptions applied equally to Section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentiality,
simply revealed the information to a third party, such as a government
agency.
Second, and perhaps most telling, the court pointed out that if an in-
house attorney's claim fails after he or she has revealed legitimately
privileged communications in an attempt to prove a retaliating discharge
claim, the attorney could be subject to discipline by the State Bar for
violating Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e). 166 The Court's
analysis appears to recognize the distinction discussed previously between
the privilege, which governs an attorney's testimony, and the duty of
confidentiality, which on its face governs an attorney's conduct in all
circumstances. Information may be deemed unprivileged and admissible in
court under the narrow attorney-client privilege, but at the same time be
protected by the broader duty of confidentiality. 67 On the other hand, the
court's statement may simply reflect a practical approach to the delicate
balancing necessitated when an in-house attorney seeks to prove a claim
against a former employer client. Presumably, if the in-house attorney fails
to convince the court that the client employer's conduct fell outside the
protection of the privilege, an in-house attorney will be deemed to have
disclosed protected client information and be subject to discipline for
violating Section 6068(e). 168 Such an outcome-determinative approach to
the protection of confidences puts in-house attorneys on notice that they
must be very sure of the rectitude of their actions before filing a retaliatory
discharge action that would require disclosure of client confidence to be
successful. 169 Further support for this interpretation can be found in the
court's statement that
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 125.
169. The limited scope of the General Dynamics decision arguably is also illustrated by the Court
of Appeal's decision a few years later in Solin v. O'Melveny & Meyers. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 456 (Ct.
App. 2001). In that case, the court upheld the dismissal of a malpractice lawsuit by one lawyer
against another law firm because the defendant law firm could not defend the lawsuit without
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the in-house attorney who publicly exposes the client's secrets will
usually find no sanctuary in the courts. Except in those rare
instances when disclosure is explicitly permitted or mandated by an
ethics code provision or statute, it is never the business of the
lawyer to disclose publicly the secrets of the client.
70
Before disclosing confidential information, the attorney contemplating such
action must be quite certain of his or her claim. 171
In sum, the precise facts and circumstances of General Dynamics, in
conjunction with the Legislature's recent amendment of Business and
Professions Code Section 6068(e) to provide an exception to the duty of
confidentiality that had already existed for the privilege, leads to the
conclusion that General Dynamics does not state a general rule that all
exceptions to privilege apply equally to the duty of confidentiality and
permit disclosures.
Another example of a case suggesting that exceptions to privilege can be
read as exceptions to the duty of confidentiality is the California Court of
Appeal's decision in Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino. 172 In that
case, the Court of Appeal addressed an employer's motion to disqualify the
attorneys for plaintiff, a former in-house attorney who had sued the
employer for sex discrimination. 73  The employer contended that the
plaintiff had revealed the employer's confidential information to her
disclosing the secrets of the clients of the plaintiff-lawyer. See id. Still, other courts have expressly
stated a belief that the exceptions to the privilege apply equally to Section 6068(e), presenting a
confusing landscape to lawyers seeking to navigate attorney confidentiality in California. See, e.g.,
People v. Dang, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2002); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v.
Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001). Fox Searchlight is discussed infra notes 172-83
and accompanying text.
170. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Super. Ct., 876 P.2d 487,503 (Cal. 1994).
171. The California Supreme Court in General Dynamics plainly struggled to find the right
balance between in-house attorneys' rights as employees with the imperative of attorney-client
confidentiality. In an earlier decision issued just months before General Dynamics, the court held
that county attorneys did not violate their duty of loyalty to their client, the county, by suing their
employer under a labor rights statute. See Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v.
Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 1994). In Woodside, the court reasoned: "It is one thing to require an
attorney, for the sake of client loyalty, to forgo a business opportunity or a potential client. It is
another thing to require an attorney, for loyalty's sake, to forgo his or her statutory rights against a
client to redress a legal injury." Id. at 1154. Applying the duty of loyalty to forbid such a suit would
"represent not a compromise between collective bargaining rights and professional obligations, as
the County contends, but a de facto judicial nullification of those rights." Id. at 1157. In like
manner, the Court in General Dynamics looked for a compromise between the in-house attorney's
right to be protected from retaliatory discharge and the employer's right to expect confidentiality, an
essential attribute of the attorney-client relationship. See generally Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 491-
505. To do that, the court permitted in-house attorneys to sue, but eschewed voluntary, public
disclosures and left open the possibility that an unsuccessful retaliatory discharge case could subject
the plaintiff-attorney to professional discipline. Id. at 492.
172. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001).
173. Id.
personal attorneys.'74 The court rejected that argument, and held that the
disqualification motion lacked merit, because the end result would be that no
attorney - not even the plaintiff herself - could assist plaintiff in vindicating
her legal rights against her former employer.
75
The court reasoned that such a de facto bar would be inconsistent with
the principles General Dynamics established. 176 Further, the court noted,
Evidence Code Section 958 renders unprivileged information that is relevant
to a case involving the alleged breach of duty by lawyer or client. 77 That
exception to privilege comes into play most often when an attorney sues a
client for unpaid fees and costs or a client sues a lawyer for malpractice.1
78
However, the principle behind that exception to privilege applies equally to
wrongful termination suits by in-house attorneys suing in their capacity as
employees. 79 In the course of applying General Dynamics to the facts
before it, the Court of Appeal stated, "Although the statute [Business and
Professions Code Section 6068(e)] on its face brooks no exceptions, it must
be read in conjunction with other statutes and ethical rules which specifically
permit the attorney to depart from the usual rules of client
confidentiality."'' 80 As with the language in General Dynamics, this broad
statement can be taken to mean that all exceptions to privilege apply equally
to the duty of confidentiality.' 8' As with the General Dynamics opinion,
however, the Fox Searchlight opinion is susceptible to a different
interpretation: the Court of Appeal was simply applying the general
principle established by the General Dynamics and Santa Clara County
Counsel cases that attorneys may sue their clients to vindicate rights held by
the attorneys. 182 In the course of such suits, it is well settled that attorneys
must be able to reveal information necessary to prosecute the suit, but only
with careful regard for the client's right to confidentiality. 83
These cases demonstrate that the issue of whether exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege may be applied equally to the duty of
confidentiality is a close one. The cases that have been cited to support that
proposition are reasonably susceptible to diametrically opposed
interpretations. California's history of strongly favoring confidentiality tilts
the balance in favor of interpreting the relevant cases as having narrow and
limited reach. Indeed, a prominent treatise on California legal ethics
concludes that General Dynamics and Fox Searchlight do not establish any
174. Id. at 910.
175. Id. at919-21.
176. Id. at 919.
177. Id. at 922.
178. See id. n.54 (pointing out that Evidence Code Section 958 applies beyond the usual cases of
"lawyer's fees or malpractice").
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
182. See Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001).
183. See id.
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general principle that exceptions to attorney-client privilege necessarily
permit attorneys to make unilateral disclosures of client confidences.
18 4
D. The Attorney's Responsibilities in the Case of Organizational
Misconduct
The duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client evidentiary privilege
both apply with full force and effect when the client is an organization.'85
With respect to the obligations of lawyers representing corporations, Rule 3-
600(A) states: "In representing an organization, a member shall conform his
or her representation to the concept that the client is the organization itself,
acting through its highest authorized officer, employee, body, or constituent
overseeing the particular engagement."1 86  The lawyer's duty is therefore
owed to the organization, and not to its constituents such as directors,
officers, employees, members, or shareholders.'87
Under the Evidence Code, the holder of the privilege is generally the
client - not the attorney. 88  The "client" is "a person who, directly or
184. PAUL W. VAPNEK ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY 7:87-88
(2003).
185. Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 257 (Ct. App. 1975). See also Brooklyn Navy Yard
Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Super. Ct., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 422-23 (Ct. App. 1997)
(acknowledging that the interest of the corporation, as counsel's client, can be adverse to those of its
shareholders); Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 895, 897 (Ct. App.
Dist. 1998) (stating that an attorney representing a corporation does not become the representative of
its shareholders); and Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 634 (Ct. App.
1991).
186. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3-600(A) (2001).
187. The Proposing Release provided that an attorney shall act in the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders. See Implementation of Standards of Prof'I Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,802
(86,513 et. seq.) (Nov. 21, 2002). The Corporations Committee and others commented that this
formulation was inconsistent with state law. In adopting the final Part 205 Rules, the SEC
acknowledged this concern:
[T]he courts have recognized that counsel to an issuer does not generally owe a legal
obligation to the constituents of an issuer-including shareholders. The Commission does
not want the final rule to suggest it is creating a fiduciary duty to shareholders that does
not currently exist. Accordingly, we have deleted from the final rule the reference to the
attorney being obligated to act in the best interest of shareholders.
Implementation of Standards of Prof]l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,069, at 87084 (Jan. 29, 2003).
However, attorneys should recognize that a move away from the traditional "corporation as
client" model is implicit in the SEC's proposals with respect to "noisy withdrawal." See PLI
Speech, supra note 59 (stating that "[t]hese proposals go beyond the 'corporation as client' principle
and stand for the important idea that some violations of law provide such risk of financial injury that
the public interest requires attorneys or their clients to make the Commission aware of the attorney's
resignation for professional reasons"). Moreover, it is unclear under the Rules which issuer is
referred to in Section 205.3(a) when an attorney represents a subsidiary, but not the parent
corporation. An interpretation that makes the attorney's obligations run to the non-client parent
would be at odds with California law.
188. CAL. EVID. CODE § 953 (West 2004).
through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer for the purpose of
retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his
professional capacity."'189 Because the term "person" includes corporations,
the attorney-client privilege is held by corporations. 190  Indeed, the
shareholders of a corporation cannot force a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege by bringing a derivative lawsuit for malpractice against the
corporation's counsel.' 9'
The California Rules of Conduct spell out the attorney's duties in the
event of wrongdoing by an agent of the corporation. The attorney cannot
recommend a violation of the law or otherwise assist in it unless he or she
believes in good faith that the law is invalid. 192 Further, an attorney "shall
not knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce any violation of these rules or the
State Bar Act."'
19 3
However, the attorney's recourse under the California Rules of Conduct
is limited. When he or she knows that an agent of the organization is acting
or refusing to act in a manner that may be a violation of the law (such as a
material violation of the securities laws) or in a manner likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, Rule 3-600(B) states that the attorney
may take such actions as appear to the lawyer to be "in the best lawful
interest of the organization."' 194  Among the available options are: "(1)
Urging reconsideration of the matter while explaining its likely
consequences to the organization; or (2) Referring the matter to the next
higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest internal authority that can
act on behalf of the organization."195
Typically this "highest internal authority" will be the corporation's
board of directors. 196  Whichever option is chosen, however, Rule 3-600
189. Id. § 951.
190. Id. § 175. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Super. Ct., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Ct. App. 2001).
191. McDermott, Will & Emery v. Super. Ct., 83 Cal. App. 4th 378 (Ct. App. 2000).
192. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-210 (2001) (applying also to regulations and rulings).
The exception for invalid laws, rules and rulings is essential to our constitutional system in which
laws, rules and rulings are often successfully challenged with the assistance of counsel. The Part
205 Rules contain no such exception. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2004)
193. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-120 (2001).
194. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2001). Note that the California Rules of
Conduct are permissive while the Part 205 Rules, discussed above, require an attorney to report up
the ladder. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
195. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B)(1), (2) (2001).
196. Subject to certain limitations, the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed
and all corporate powers exercised by or under the direction of the board of Directors. CAL. CORP.
CODE §300(a) (West 2004). See also H. MARSH ET. AL., MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS
LAW §10.01 ("[Tlhe board of directors is the governing body of the corporation and ultimately
responsible for all decisions taken."). The corresponding provisions of the California Nonprofit
Corporation Law essentially mirror those of General Corporation Law. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5210,
7210 (West 2004). However, in the case of a religious corporation, the applicable section was
modified to permit the corporation to be governed in accordance with the applicable tenets of the
religious organization. Id. § 9210. Similar provisions exist in the corporate laws of other states.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2004) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."); NEV.
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expressly states that the lawyer "shall not violate his or her duty of
protecting all confidential information as provided in Business and
Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)."' 197 While the attorney may
discuss the matter with constituents within the corporation, all the way up to
the board of directors, the attorney is not permitted to disclose information
protected under Section 6068(e) outside the corporation.
198
If the company's highest authority nevertheless persists in illegal
conduct that is likely to result in substantial injury to the entity, Rule 3-
600(C) provides that the attorney has the right, and in some cases the duty,
to resign.' 99 Withdrawal from employment is permissive if the client:
[S]eeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct, or... insists that the
member pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is
prohibited under these rules or the State Bar Act, or... [t]he
continued employment is likely to result in a violation of these rules
or of the State Bar Act.
200
Withdrawal is mandatory if "[t]he member knows or should know that
continued employment will result in violation of these rules or of the State
Bar Act.",20 1 Withdrawal is, however, still subject to Section 6068(e)(1) and
the lawyer is prohibited from disclosing client confidential information upon
or after withdrawal.
REV. STAT. 78.120(1) (2004) ("Subject only to such limitations as may be provided by this chapter,
or the articles of incorporation of the corporation, the board of directors has full control over the
affairs of the corporation.").
197. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2001).
198. The "legislative history" of rule 3-600 expressly states that "[tihe proposed rule would make
clear that an attorney should not play the role of whistle blower: he or she may not go outside the
organization in order to rectify a perceived or prospective wrong." Office of Professional Standards,
State Bar of California, Request that the Supreme Court of California Approve Amendments to the
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, and Memorandum and Supporting
Documents in Explanation 39 (December 1987). In explaining the purpose of the proposed rule, the
request noted: "An attorney who represents an organization must maintain a confidential relationship
with it. This confidential relationship includes only the organization, not other parties who have
some kind of stake in the organization's activities." Id. at 38 (emphasis added). In addition, when
the State Bar sought to amend rule 3-600 in 2002 to permit an attorney representing a governmental
agency to report governmental misconduct to an oversight or law enforcement agency, the California
Supreme Court stated, in its order declining to approve the rule amendment, that "[t]he State Bar
Board of Governors' request to adopt amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-600,
is denied because the proposed modifications conflict with [Business and Professions Code Section
6068, subdivision (e)]." Cal. S. Ct. Order No. 46 (2004). (Supreme Court Order, En Banc, filed May
10, 2002, In the Matter of the Adoption of Amendments to Rule 3-600 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, Bar Misc. S 104682.).
199. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(c) (2001).
200. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-700(C)(1),(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
201. CAL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3-700(B)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
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E. Perspectives on California's Requirements
It is apparent that the State Bar Act, the California Rules of Professional
Conduct, and the decisions of California courts consistently confirm the
societal importance of fostering and maintaining the confidential nature of
the attorney-client relationship. However, as in other areas of the law, the
issues are more gray than black and white. Other public policy
considerations can take precedence over the evidentiary privilege or the duty
of confidentiality. In that regard, the courts and the State Bar appear to be
willing, in very fact-specific circumstances, to exercise discretion not to
discipline attorneys who have made limited disclosures of client confidences
and secrets where (a) the legislature has declared the importance of
countervailing policy considerations, as in exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege or under the Whistle-Blower Protection Act,20 2 (b) the attorney
making the disclosure has used discretion (or court direction in the event of
the evidentiary privilege) to limit the disclosure as much as possible, 20 3 and
(c) the attorney has correctly determined that the countervailing policy
justified the limited disclosure in the context in which the disclosure was
made and in light of the actual result obtained.2°
Nevertheless, California attorneys must be mindful that state law does
not include an exception to the statutory duty to maintain client secrets that
would allow the lawyer to blow the whistle on a client who is violating
federal or state securities laws.20 5 In the absence of any such exception, a
California attorney disclosing client confidences outside of the corporate
hierarchy in an attempt to rectify or mitigate the effects of the client's
potentially criminal or fraudulent conduct would be acting at his or her peril,
facing the risk of both malpractice exposure and discipline for violating
Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e).
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SEC'S AUTHORITY
As discussed above, the Part 205 Rules permit, and the SEC has actively
encouraged, attorney conduct that is inconsistent with the obligations of
206AsaoCalifornia lawyers and potentially of lawyers in other states. As also
noted above, the SEC takes the position that its Rules preempt conflicting
state laws and rules mandating attorney-client confidentiality. 20 7 However,
202. See supra notes 104, 119-25 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
206. This article does not address whether the Part 205 Rules may also be inconsistent with the
provisions of the ABA Model Rules, which California does not follow. The Committee notes,
however, that one state bar association which does follow the ABA Model Rules (the Washington
State Bar Association) has concluded that there is sufficient uncertainty on that point as to prevent
any member of it from acting "in good faith" in relying on the permissive disclosure provisions of
the Part 205 Rules. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. See also supra note 15 regarding
conflict between the ABA Model Rules (and the rules of Oklahoma which follow it) and the Part
205 Rules.
207. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
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the mere assertion of preemption does not make it so. Further, the SEC's
position has yet to be tested in court. To sustain its claim, the SEC must first
show that its Rules were adopted within the scope of its authority and, if so,
then demonstrate that well-established standards for federal preemption of
state law have been met.2"8
The question of authority is variously addressed in the context of
constitutional law principles regarding delegation of legislative authority
20 9
or with reference to corresponding provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.210 In the case of preemption, regulations adopted by federal
agencies may only preempt state law if (i) there is a constitutional basis for
Congress to authorize the agency to preempt state law, (ii) Congress
authorized the agency to preempt state law, and (iii) the Congressional
authority grants the agency the power to adopt preemptive rules in the area
covered by the regulation. 211 This Part examines each of these requirements
and concludes that the SEC does not have the authority to preempt state
confidentiality requirements. 2 Courts may elect to stop short of addressing
preemption issues if they can find absence of authority. For that reason, the
latter topic is an inherent part of any examination of the preemption asserted
by the SEC.
A. The Debate Leading to Adoption of the Rules
Several bar associations questioned the SEC's authority to preempt state
laws or rules governing attorney-client confidentiality. 13 In adopting the
208. See infra notes 232-246 and 249-265 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
210. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-06 (West 2004). The "Administrative Procedure Act" as originally
enacted was repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554 and incorporated into those provisions of 5 U.S.C.,
which continue to be known popularly as the "Administrative Procedure Act." The portions of it
specifically relevant to the issues presented in this article are found in 5 U.S.C. § 706.
211. BASIL J. MEZINES ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03[5] (1995). See also Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns., 531 U.S. 457, 572 (2001).
212. This article does not address the situation in which any state law or bar regulations would
prevent an attorney from reporting "up the ladder" as is specifically provided in Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Committee is unaware of any state where that might be the case and notes
that reporting "up the ladder" within the organizational structure of a client has long been permitted
under the California Rules of Practice (Rule 3-600(B)) and is consistent with provisions of the
California Corporations Code § 300(a) (specifying that the corporation is managed by and under the
direction of the board of directors). However, if the Rules are interpreted so as to require an attorney
to report "up the ladder" to a parent corporation, that interpretation would clearly conflict with
Section 6068(e) and the principle under California law that an attorney does not by virtue of his or
her representation of a corporation also represent its shareholders. See supra notes 34-40, 63, and
194-96 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to the Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Dec. 18, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm ("The
Commission cannot itself establish its authority to preempt state privilege rules."); Letter from Jeff
Bleich, President, Bar Ass'n of San Francisco, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch.
Part 205 Rules, the SEC cited a plethora of statutory provisions in support of
its authority to adopt the attorney conduct rules.214 However, none of the
statutes cited by the SEC expressly empowers the SEC with specific
authority to permit counsel to disclose client secrets or to immunize
attorneys from state laws and rules prohibiting such disclosure. The
Proposing Release and the Adopting Release both discuss the public policy
considerations relevant to the adoption of the Rules, specifically addressing
whether they should preempt state law. Both Releases are surprisingly
sparse, however, in their discussion of the basic question of whether the SEC
actually has authority to adopt preemptive rules in this area.215
The Proposing Release itself raised the question of a conflict with state
rules forbidding disclosure of client confidences. It did so in the context of
observing that the attorney rules for some states require attorney disclosure
of client confidences in certain circumstances involving the criminal, illegal
or fraudulent acts.21 6 It acknowledges, however, that the rules of other states
prohibit the disclosure of client confidences without exception.1 7 In
addressing these conflicting state law approaches, the Proposing Release
accepts that it is possible for an attorney to comply with both state law and
the proposed rules: (i) in states for which disclosure is prohibited, the
attorney could be in compliance with the Rules by electing not to do so, and
(ii) in states that require disclosure of criminal, illegal or fraudulent acts, the
attorney could be in compliance by electing to disclose that information to
the SEC.218 At the same time, however, the Proposing Release states:
[P]ermitting disclosure would appear to preempt a state's rule
forbidding disclosure. Accordingly, an attorney appearing and
practicing before the [SEC] who is admitted in a jurisdiction that
forbids disclosure of confidential information under circumstances
where the proposed rule would permit disclosure, may disclose the
information to the [SEC] notwithstanding the contrary state rule.21 9
At a later point in the Proposing Release, the SEC does acknowledge the
risk that an attorney might be subject to simultaneous disciplinary
Comm'n (April 3, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jbleichl.htm ("The SEC,
with its adoption of 17 CFR Part 205 ... has met, and in the view of many commentators, has gone
beyond Congress' mandate under Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.").
214. The SEC cited, as authority for the adoption of Part 205, "Sections 3, 307 and 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 19 of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 3(b), 4C, 13, and 23
of the Exchange Act, Sections 38 and 39 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and Section 211
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940." Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,823 (87,069 et. seq.) (Jan. 29, 2003) (citations omitted).
215. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
216. The SEC cited New Jersey, Wisconsin and Florida. Implementation of Standards of Prof'1
Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 86,802, at 86,547 (Nov. 21, 2002).
217. See id.
218. id.
219. Id. at 86,548.
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proceedings both by the SEC and by state authorities, raising the question,
according to the Proposing Release, of the impact of the proposed Part 205
Rules upon state ethical rules and regulations. 220  The Proposing Release
goes on to state that "[d]ue to the breadth and specificity of the
Congressional mandate to the [SEC] to implement an 'up the ladder'
reporting system ... the [SEC] is considering whether Congress intended
for the [SEC's] rule to 'occupy the field' on this issue, and whether Part 205
would preempt any [conflicting] state rules.",22 ' Thus, despite its post hoc
assertions to the contrary, the SEC has itself acknowledged that its authority
to preempt state law was questionable.
The Proposing Release then further discusses the potential benefit of
preemption from the standpoint of providing a single, uniform rule of
conduct for attorneys, particularly including attorneys who practice in
multiple jurisdictions.222 However, neither the Proposing Release nor the
Adopting Release contains any further discussion about whether Congress
did in fact intend to "occupy the field" and, if so, whether it was on the
limited topic of reporting "up-the-ladder" (which is specifically addressed in
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) or more generally on the topic of
client confidentiality (which is not addressed in that Section at all). 223 In
addition, neither of the SEC releases addressed whether Congress intended
to confer specific authority on the SEC to adopt rules preempting state law
in the area of attomey-client communications or related attorney ethical
requirements.224
The Adopting Release acknowledges that "a number of commenters
[had] questioned the [SEC's] authority to preempt state [attorney] ethics
rules, at least without being explicitly authorized and directed to do so by
Congress.,, 225 The Adopting Release then states that:
220. Id.
221. Id. at 86,544.
222. Id.
223. As noted below, the issue under federal preemption case law is whether Congress intended
that the provision contained in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "occupied the field," not
whether the SEC intended to do so when it adopted the Rules. See supra notes 298-313 and
accompanying text. As an administrative agency, the SEC does not have the power to preempt by
assertion.
224. See Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No.
33-8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823 (87,069 et. seq.) (Jan. 29,
2003) (citations omitted); Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 33-8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,802, at 86,547
(Nov. 21, 2002).
225. Implementation of Standards of Prof I Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823 (87,069 et. seq.) (Jan. 29,
2003). See, e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, at 28 ("There is nothing in Section 307
to suggest that Congress authorized the Commission to preempt state law and rules governing
attorney conduct.").
Another comment letter noted that the Constitution's Commerce
Clause grants the federal government the power to regulate the
securities industry, that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the [SEC]
to establish rules setting forth minimum standards of conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before [the SEC], and that, under
the Supremacy Clause, [the adopted Part 205 rules] will preempt
conflicting state rules.
2 6
The Adopting Release also notes that "several commenters questioned why
the [SEC] would seek to supplant state ethical rules which impose a higher
[disclosure] obligation upon attorneys. ' 227
The Adopting Release further states that the Part 205 Rules do not
"preempt ethical rules in United States jurisdictions that establish more
rigorous obligations than those imposed by [the SEC's rules]. 228  It
specifically notes in contrast, however, that the SEC "reaffirms that its rules
shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws of a state or other
United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is admitted or practices. 229
With specific reference to Rule 205.3(d)(2), the Adopting Release notes that
the SEC had received comments "that this provision would preempt state
law ethics rules that do not permit disclosure of information concerning such
[client] acts," as well as concerns expressed by "commenters at the other end
of the spectrum that this [rule] could be misread to supplant state ethics rules
that require rather than permit [such] disclosure. '230 The Adopting Release
does not directly address those issues. Instead, it simply refers to the text
quoted above dealing with the general proposition that the Part 205 Rules
supplement more restrictive state rules and supersede those that are less
restrictive, without further discussion or explanation of the SEC's basis for
its position that it has preemptive authority in this area.23'
B. Did the SEC Act in Excess of the Authority Granted by Congress?
Any judicial examination of the extent of the SEC's authority to adopt
the Part 205 Rules is likely to begin with Section 706 of the Administrative
Procedures Act, which sets forth the scope of review by federal courts of the
actions of federal agencies.232 Under Section 706(2)(C), a reviewing court is
required to hold unlawful and to set aside rules or other actions that are
found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
226. Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823 (87,069 et. seq.) (Jan. 29,
2003). The SEC cited the Comments of Professor Susan P. Koniak, Boston University School of
Law. Id.
227. Id. at 87,071.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2004).
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short of statutory right.9233 As explained by Justice Powell in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder: "The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency
charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make
law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will
of Congress as expressed by the statute."' 23 4 The question, then, is whether
Congress has given the SEC statutory authority, either in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act or in the previously existing provisions of the federal securities laws, to
adopt attorney conduct rules of the scope set forth in the Part 205 Rules.
When Congress has "explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. 235  The resulting regulations are
ordinarily given controlling weight, but this rule does not apply if they are
"procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute" pursuant to which they have been adopted.
2 36
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,2 37 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the SEC had acted in excess of its authority when
it adopted Rule 19c-4 under the Exchange Act.23 8 Rule 19c-4 would have
barred national securities exchanges from listing stock of a corporation that
takes any action to nullify, restrict or disparately reduce the per share voting
rights of existing common stockholders.23 9 The Court of Appeals carefully
examined the authority granted by Congress to the SEC under the Exchange
Act.240 The SEC argued that it had broad authority to adopt regulations in
furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.241 The Court of Appeals,
however, concluded that "the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include
regulation of an issue that is so far beyond matters of disclosure [which the
court treated as a principal purpose of the Exchange Act] ... and of the
management and practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is
,,242concededly a part of corporate governance traditionally left to the states.
The Rules regarding the disclosure of confidential information in a
manner that is inconsistent with state law appear to exceed the grant of
authority from Congress to the Commission in Section 307. If a court so
233. Id. § 706(2)(c).
234. 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)). In
Hochfelder, the United States Supreme Court held that a private cause of action for damages will not
lie under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the absence of an allegation of scienter. Id. at 193.
235. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
236. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
237. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
238. Id. at 407.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 408-16.
241. Id. at 410-11.
242. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
concluded, the Rules would be set aside.a43 Furthermore, the SEC's
interpretation of its expansive authority to promulgate such rules, and to
preempt state law, is not entitled to deference.244 The regulation of attorneys
has traditionally been the responsibility of the states, not the federal
government. As the Supreme Court noted:
Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of
lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of
Columbia within their respective jurisdictions. The States prescribe
the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of
professional conduct. They are also responsible for the discipline of
lawyers.245
A more difficult and novel issue is raised by the fact that the SEC has in
effect preempted the rules of the federal courts. Attorneys appearing in
federal district court in California are subject to the California State Bar Act
and Rules of Professional Conduct. 246  Thus, the SEC's action raises the
question of whether an administrative agency may in effect overturn the
rules of the federal courts. While an analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article, there is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended to, or could, authorize the SEC to override rules of
conduct adopted by the federal district courts.
243. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2004) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside
agency action ... found to be... in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.").
244. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001):
The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been
understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency's position .... The approach has produced a spectrum of
judicial responses, from great respect at one end ... to near indifference at the other....
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
245. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,442 (1979).
246. U.S. Dist. Ct. (C.D. Cal.) Local Rule No. 83-3.1.2; U.S. Dist. Ct. (E.D. Cal.) Local Rule No.
83-180(e); U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Cal.) Local Rule No. ll-4(a)(l); U.S. Dist. Ct. (S.D. Cal.) Local
Rule No. 83-4(b). See Image Technical Serv. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1357 (9th
Cir. 1998) ("California law controls whether an ethical violation occurred."); Visa U.S.A., Inc. v.
First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("The Northern District of California
has adopted the California Rules of Professional Conduct at Civ. L.R. 11-4, and attorneys practicing
in this court are required to adhere to those standards, as articulated in the rules and any court
decisions interpreting them."); Miller v. Alagna, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
("Pursuant to Local Rule 2.5.1, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California ... adopts the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the decisions of any
applicable court."); Terrebonne, Ltd. of Cal. v. Murray, I F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (E.D. Cal.
1998); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Targets, 918 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
("Attorneys admitted to practice in the Southern District of California must adhere to the California
Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct."). Rule 1-100(d)(2) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct also states, with
respect to "lawyers from other jurisdictions who are not members" of the State Bar of California,
that "[tlhese rules shall also govern the activities of lawyers while engaged in the performance of
lawyer functions in this state; but nothing contained in these rules shall be deemed to authorize the
performance of such functions by such persons in this state except as otherwise permitted by law."
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. I - I 00(d)(2) (2004).
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C. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
As cited above, Section 307 addresses the reporting by an attorney of
evidence of a material violation first to the issuer's chief legal counsel or
chief executive officer, and then, if the officers to whom the report is made
do not "appropriately respond," the reporting by the attorney up-the-ladder
to the "audit committee" of the board of directors or to the board of directors
itself.247 Nothing in this language mandates, or suggests, that an attorney
should "report out" evidence of a material violation to the SEC or any other
third party.
The source of the SEC's authority to require reporting out, therefore,
must come from Congress' grant of authority to the SEC to adopt rules
implementing the specific mandates of Section 307. This general mandate
directs the SEC, "in the public interest and for the protection of investors,"
to adopt "minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the [SEC]," including a rule incorporating
the above two specific mandates of Section 307.248
D. Federal Preemption Doctrine
Any judicial proceeding that weighs the Part 205 Rules against
conflicting California law must examine the prevailing body of law
governing federal preemption. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. '249 As noted by Justice Stevens, since McCulloch v.
Maryland "it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is
'without effect. ' ' 250 "Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy
Clause starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
are 'not to be superseded by ... [f]ederal [a]ct unless that is the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.' 251 This presumption against the preemption
247. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (West Supp. 2004).
248. Id.
249. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. At least one commentator has observed that "preemption"
actually has virtually nothing to do with the Supremacy Clause but instead is a straight-forward
examination of what Congress actually did in approving a law being examined for such preemption.
See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994). While the
analysis presented in that article is thought-provoking, the fact remains that courts continue to "'start
from the top' with a reference to the Supremacy Clause" when opining on issues of federal
preemption of state laws. See id. at 769.
250. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
251. Id. (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Flower Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). See also Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 505 ("This conclusion is required by. .. the strong presumption against pre-emption of
of state police power regulations requires a narrow reading of the conflicting
federal act.2
52
"'The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of preemption
analysis. 253 Congressional intent may be "explicitly stated in a statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. 254 Federal
law can preempt state law through express preemption or implied
preemption.255 Express preemption exists where Congress enacts an explicit
statutory command that state law be displaced, as in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),256 which states that it
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.2 57
In the absence of express statement of preemption in the text of a federal
law, preemption can be implied on either of two theories which require a
court to examine the intent of Congress from the statute's structure: field
preemption or conflict preemption.25 ' Field preemption exists when "[t]he
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplant it."
259
Conflict preemption exists when compliance with both federal and state law
is impossible,26 ° or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 2 6'
When the federal statute "does not speak directly to [an] issue," the
court looks to the "goals and policies" of the federal law in question "in
determining whether it in fact pre-empts., 262 "[C]ourts should not lightly
infer pre-emption. '2 63 The court's ultimate task is to determine whether
state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the statute as a
state police power regulations ...."); California v. ARC America, 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) ("In this
case, in addition, appellees must overcome the presumption against finding pre-emption of state law
in areas traditionally regulated by the States."); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)
("Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("So
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."); accord Dowhal v.
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d I (Cal. 2004).
252. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518; see also Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422 (Cal. 2004).
253. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963)).
254. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
255. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004).
257. Id.
258. Ting, 319F.3dat 1135.
259. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1942) (citing Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942)); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569
(1919)).
260. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
261. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
262. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,493 (1987).
263. Id.at491.
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whole.2 4  When a federal agency asserts that regulations adopted by it
preempt state laws on an implied basis, it bears the burden of proving that
Congress intended that the law passed by it under which the regulation was
adopted would, in fact, preempt state law.265
E. Express Preemption
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not contain any express provisions
governing disclosure by any attorney of client confidences, nor does it
expressly preempt inconsistent state law. Instead, Section 307 of the Act
266
sets forth a very precise Congressional directive to the SEC to issue rules "in
the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,"
including a rule requiring attorneys to report evidence of violations of the
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty up the ladder in the corporation.267
The standard required for a court to find express preemption is quite
straight-forward: the text of the statute must indicate that Congress has
"unmistakably ... ordained" 268 that "its enactments alone are to regulate ' 269
the subject matter. That occurs when "Congress' command [of preemption]
is explicitly stated in the statute's language., 270 Even when it is so stated
with respect to one aspect of a federal statute, it will not be extended to
another aspect if it is unnecessary to do so. 27' The Corporations Committee
is unaware of any assertion by the SEC that Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act expressly preempts state requirements regarding the
attorney-client relationship, or expressly authorizes the SEC to adopt
regulations which do so.272 Section 307 of the Act is, in fact, completely
devoid of text which suggests either. 73
264. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
265. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12.4
(3d ed., 1999) (synthesizing the holdings of and citing New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Fort Halifax
Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984)). See also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2004).
267. Id.
268. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
269. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
270. Id.
271. See generally Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
272. The Public Statement specifically asserted both categories of implied preemption: field
preemption and conflict preemption. See supra notes72, 76-89 and accompanying text.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2004). Indeed, proponents of SEC preemption have acknowledged that
there is no express preemption. Cramton et al., supra note 27, at 792 (conceding that "the statute
makes no explicit reference to preemption").
F. Legislative Intent-Implied Preemption
A court reviewing an administrative regulation must first examine
whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, using
"traditional tools of statutory interpretation - text, structure, purpose and
legislative history., 27 4 If the statute is ambiguous or silent on the issue, the
court must next determine what kind of deference should be accorded to the
agency's interpretation. The deference accorded will depend on the
thoroughness evident in the agency's consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.275
An agency's interpretation "is not entitled to deference when it goes
beyond the meaning the statute can bear. ' 27 6 The implausibility of Congress
leaving a highly significant issue unaddressed and thus delegating it to the
agency is reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress intended the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.277 As Justice Scalia has noted,
"Congress . . . does not ... hide elephants in mouseholes."
278
As previously noted, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself does not contain any
provisions authorizing attorney disclosure of client confidences. Instead,
Section 307 directs the SEC to issue rules setting forth "minimum standards"
for professional conduct for attorneys, "including a rule" that requires
attorneys to report evidence of wrongdoing to higher-ups within the
corporation.279 Such "reporting up" requirement is consistent with a
California attorney's duties to a corporate client under Rule 3-600 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and Business and Professions Code
Section 6068(e). 280  None of these provisions entails "reporting out," or
disclosing confidential client information outside the company. The conflict
with California's duty of confidentiality, therefore, is created not by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but by the Part 205 Rules that would permit, and
possibly even require,2 8 disclosure without the client's consent.
274. Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 330 F.3d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation & quotations
omitted).
275. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
276. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994); see also Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
277. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 146-47, 159-60 (2000).
278. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). What no doubt will
become an oft-quoted phrase was in essence a summary of a finding in MCI Telecomms. v. AT&T
Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) ("It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of
whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion-and
even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to 'modify'
rate-filing requirements.").
279. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2004). The contrast between Section 307 and the Part 205 Rules is
noteworthy: the former focuses on conduct by the attorney while the latter focus on conduct by the
client which would trigger a safe harbor for disclosure of the conduct of the client.
280. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600 (2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)
(West 2003).
281. See supra notes 43, 73, & 196 and accompanying text.
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G. The Legislative History
The SEC has contended in public statements that the Part 205 Rules are
consistent with Congress' mandate to establish minimum standards for
attorney conduct, and that Congress specificity regarding "reporting up" the
corporate ladder was not intended to be exclusive.282 The relevant questions,
then, are (i) did Congress intend to authorize the SEC to promulgate
standards permitting lawyers to "report out" confidential client information
without the client's consent, 28 3 and (ii) did Congress intend such rules to
preempt state law that prohibits such disclosures?
284
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was notable for its "swift" passage, which left
little time for extended floor debate by Congress. 285 There is, in fact, no
evidence in the legislative history that Congress desired to include any sort
of "reporting out" requirement. The focus was on reinforcing the lawyer's
duty to his client, defined as the corporation and the board of directors who
represent the shareholders. During the Senate debate, Senator Edwards of
North Carolina, a sponsor of the amendment to add Section 307 to the Act,
summarized the amendment succinctly:
Let me be a little more specific about what this amendment does
and what the responsibility of a lawyer is and should be. If you are
a lawyer for a corporation, your client is the corporation and you
work for the corporation and you work for the shareholders, the
investors in that corporation; that is to whom you owe your
responsibility and loyalty....
If you find out that the managers are breaking the law, you must tell
them to stop. If they won't stop, you go to the board of directors,
which represents the shareholders, and tell them what is going on.
If they won't act responsibly and in compliance with the law, then
you go to the board and say something has to be done; there is a
violation of the law occurring. It is basically going up the ladder,
up the chain of command....
The time has come for Congress to act. This amendment acts in a
very simple way. It basically instructs the SEC to start doing
282. See Prezioso, supra note 92.
283. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, For Sarbanes, the Grumbling Was Expected, BALT. SUN,
July 29, 2003, at ID (describing the efforts of Senator Sarbanes and Rep. Oxley to push the
legislation "to swift enactment"); Andrew Parker & Tony Tassell, US Ccrporate Reform Efforts
Come Under Attack in Britain, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at I (referencing the "swift approval" of
the legislation).
exactly what they were doing 20 years ago, to start enforcing this
up-the-ladder principle.286
Senator Enzi of Wyoming, a co-sponsor, added:
This amendment [Section 307] is designed to assure that attorneys
are responsible for fully informing their corporate client of evidence
of material violations of Federal securities law...
When their counsel and advice is sought, attorneys should have an
explicit, not just an implied, duty to advise the primary officer and
then, if necessary, the auditing committee or the board of directors
of any serious legal violation of the law by a corporate agent.
Currently, there is no explicit mandate requiring this standard of
conduct.287
This amendment instructs the Commission to establish rules that
require an attorney, with evidence of material legal violation by the
corporation or its agent, to notify the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of such evidence and the appropriate response to
correct it. If these officers do not promptly take action in response,
the Commission is instructed to establish a rule that the attorney
then has a duty, to take further appropriate action, including
notifying the audit committee of the board of directors or the board
of directors themselves, of such evidence and the actions of the
attorney and others regarding this evidence. It is all within the
corporation.288
Senator Enzi compared the proposed rule to the IRS regulation, 31 CFR part
10.21, which requires tax attorneys to advise their clients if they learn the
client has not complied with the revenue laws, and he contrasted the
proposed rule with the more onerous disclosure requirement for accountants,
which requires auditors to report violations both to the client's directors and
simultaneously to the SEC.289
286. 148 CONG. REC. S6551-52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (emphasis added).
287. As to an attorney's responsibilities under the California Rules of Conduct, see supra note 185
and accompanying text.
288. 148 CONG. REC. S6554-55 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (emphasis added).
289. Id. The Corporations Committee published a "Public Commentary" dated November 18,
2003, pointing out (among other things) that the roles and duties of attorneys and independent public
auditors are fundamentally different. The Public Commentary specifically noted "the regulations of
the California Board of Accountancy make numerous exceptions to an accountant's duty to maintain
client confidences, including disclosures made in response to an official inquiry from a federal or
state government regulatory agency." Keith Paul Bishop, et al., A Public Commentary from the
Corporations Committee: "At Ever Peril-" New Pressures on the Attorney-Client Relationship, 23
BUS. L. NEWS 5, 21 (2003). The text of the Public Commentary is available on the Corporations
Committee's website at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sectionslbuslaw/corporations/2003-11-
18_public-commentary.pdf.
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Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that Congress did not
intend that Section 307 would abrogate the traditional confidentiality of
communications between corporate lawyers and their clients by requiring
attorneys to report outside the corporation. Senator Enzi stated:
The amendment I am supporting would not require the attorneys to
report violations to the SEC, only to corporate legal counsel or the
CEO, and ultimately, to the board of directors.
Some argue that the amendment will cause a breach of
client/attorney privilege, which is ludicrous. The attorney owes a
duty to its client which is the corporation and the shareholders. By
reporting a legal violation to management and then the board of
directors, no breach of the privilege occurs, because it is all internal
- within the corporation and not to an outside party, such as the
SEC.
This amendment also does not empower the SEC to cause attorneys
to breach their attorney/client privilege.2 90
This intent was confirmed by Senator Edwards in the following
exchange with Senator Sarbanes of Maryland, one of principal authors of the
Act:
Mr. SARBANES. It is my understanding that this amendment,
which places responsibility on the lawyer for the corporation to
report up the ladder, only involves going up within the corporate
structure. He doesn't go outside of the corporate structure. So the
lawyer would first go to the chief legal officer, or the chief
executive officer, and if he didn't get an appropriate response, he
would go to the board of directors. Is that correct?
Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, my response to the question is the
only obligation that this amendment creates is the obligation to
report to the client, which begins with the chief legal officer, and, if
that is unsuccessful, then to the board of the corporation. There is
no obligation to report anything outside the client - the
corporation.
290. 148 CONG. REC. S6554-55 (daily ed. July 10, 2002). Authors of a recent article in support of
the SEC's preemptive authority overlooked this statement by Senator Enzi. See Crampton et al.,
supra note 27. While Senator Enzi's statement could be read narrowly to say that Section 307 does
not empower the SEC to force breaches of the privilege, it could also be understood to say that the
SEC cannot "cause" breaches by offering immunity to attorneys for doing so.
Mr. SARBANES. I think that is an important point. I simply
asked the question in order to stress the fact that that is the way this
amendment works. This has been a very carefully worked out
amendment.29'
Based on the legislative history of Section 307, it appears clear that
Congress was concerned about the impact that new standards of professional
conduct might have on the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications. There is no indication that Congress intended to abrogate
the privilege and duty that exists under the law of every state. At a
minimum, it is at least doubtful that Congress intended to authorize the SEC
to include a rule that would encourage attorneys to report evidence of
wrongdoing outside the corporation.
The SEC may argue that Section 205.3(d)(2) is merely permissive, and
does not require an attorney to report to the SEC, which was the concern that
Senator Edwards and Senator Enzi expressed. The distinction is a fine one,
however, and is not reflected in the floor debate. Moreover, there is no
indication that any such "permission" could be granted under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act by the SEC other than with respect to any of its own rules of
conduct which might otherwise be interpreted as inhibiting disclosure of
client confidences. There is no suggestion that Congress intended to invite
(or empower the SEC to invite), but not require, reporting outside the
corporation, as a means of strengthening the lawyer's duty to the corporate
client.
The SEC also may seek to ascribe significance to the extensive criticism
in the legislative history of the purported failure of attorneys to police their
peers who fail to place the interests of the corporation ahead of management.
Senator Edwards stated, "With Enron and Worldcom, and all the other
corporate misconduct we have seen, it is again clear that corporate lawyers
should not be left to regulate themselves no more than accountants should be
left to regulate themselves., 292 Senator Enzi added:
I am usually in the camp that believes States should regulate
professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the
State bars as a whole have failed. They have provided no specific
ethical rule of conduct to remedy this kind of situation. Even if they
do have a general rule that applies, it often goes unenforced. Most
States also do not have the ability to investigate attorney violations
involved with the complex circumstances of audit procedures within
giant corporations. 293
However, by limiting its solution to "up-the-ladder reporting," and
forswearing any alteration of the attorney-client privilege, Congress did not
demonstrate any discernible intent to occupy the entire field of lawyer
291. 148 CONG. REC. S6557 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (emphasis added).
292. 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002).
293. 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002).
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regulation, or to preempt state laws that would prohibit disclosure of
confidential client information outside the corporation. "[WIhen Congress
remains silent regarding the preemptive effect of its legislation on state laws
it knows to be in existence at the time of such legislation's passing,
Congress has failed to evince the requisite clear and manifest purpose to
supersede those state laws. 294
The Congressional debate demonstrated recognition of, and adherence
to, the qualitative distinction between reporting up the ladder within the
corporation and reporting out. The debate shows that Congress regarded the
former as fulfilling the attorney's duty to the corporate client. The Senators
acknowledged that the latter was limited by the attorney-client privilege that
exists under the law of every state. Therefore, there is no actual conflict
between Section 307 and the duty of lawyer-client confidentiality, and
California law governing the duty of confidentiality is not an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.295
There is no indication in the legislative record that Congress intended
for rules adopted under Section 307 to preempt any state's law governing
attorney conduct. Indeed the absence of specific text in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act itself is a marked contrast with the manner in which Congress has
addressed the obligations of independent accountants. Section 10A(b) of the
Exchange Act imposes specific obligations on independent accountants to
report directly to the SEC in specified circumstances.296 Thus, it is quite
clear that Congress knows how to craft a reporting out statute had it intended
to do So. 2
97
294. Pennsylvania Med. Soc'y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 850 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing California
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1987)).
295. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000).
296. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2004).
297. See Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) ("Congress' enactment of a
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
pre-empted."). In that context, it is similarly worth noting that Congress actually did assert
preemption over certain state laws and regulations relating to the accounting profession in Section
101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
(f) Powers of the board. In addition to any authority granted to the Board otherwise in
this Act, the Board shall have the power, subject to section 107 [15 U.S.C. §7217]...
(2) to conduct its operations and maintain offices, and to exercise all other rights
and powers authorized by this Act, in any State, without regard to any qualification,
licensing, or other provision of law in effect in such State (or a political subdivision
thereof);
15 U.S.C. § 7211(0(2) (2004). The Court in the Cippilone case identified its conclusion as a
"variant of the familiar principle of expression unius est exclusio alterius." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
517.
H. Field Preemption
The Part 205 Rules would effect a significant change in California's
traditional regulation of attorneys and the standards of their professional
conduct. It is implausible that Congress intended to delegate authority to the
SEC to make such a fundamental change, especially in the absence of a clear
expression by Congress of any intent to permit disclosure of confidential
client information. 98 In an analogous case, Oregon v. Ashcroft, the Ninth
Circuit invalidated the Attorney General's regulation prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide because the regulation encroached on the state's authority to
regulate medical practice without a clear statement by Congress authorizing
such intrusion.2 99  The opinion of the Court of Appeals is particularly
relevant to the analysis of preemption with respect to the Part 205 Rules. It
states, "Unless Congress' authorization is 'unmistakably clear,' the Attorney
General may not exercise control over an area of law traditionally reserved
for state authority... 'This concern is heightened where an administrative
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power."300
In several recent examples, Congress and the courts have respected the
right of states to regulate the ethical conduct of attorneys who practice in
their jurisdictions. Thus, in the McDade Amendment, Congress confirmed
that federal prosecutors are subject to state and local rules governing
attorney conduct.30 1  Similarly, Congress did not intend the sweeping
privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to apply to attorneys, an
area of regulation traditionally reserved to the states. A recent U.S. District
Court ruling to that effect is relevant to the analysis of preemption with
respect to the Part 205 Rules: "[T]he delegation of authority to the FTC by
Congress to regulate the ethical conduct of attorneys in the face of
approximately two hundred years of exclusive state regulation in such subtle
way would be, in the words of Justice Scalia, like 'hid[ing an] elephant[] in a
mousehole.' 30 2 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
federal law does not preempt California's authority to discipline or disbar
attorneys admitted to practice in California who practice immigration law
exclusively in federal court.30 3
Some recent cases might suggest that the SEC's comprehensive scheme
of regulation of the securities industry may preempt California law, even
where the goals are similar. In Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the
298. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 146-47 (2000); Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,468 (2001).
299. 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
300. Id., at 1125 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001)).
301. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2004); see also United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d
1252 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
302. New York State Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 136 (D.D.C. 2003). See supra note
276 and accompanying text.
303. Gadda v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2004).
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district court held that California's new ethics standards for non-judicial
arbitrators in Division VI of the Appendix to the California Rules of Court
were preempted by the Exchange Act and the comprehensive system of
federal regulation of the securities industry, and the Federal Arbitration
Act.3°4  The distinguishing feature of these cases, however, was that
California was purporting to introduce new rules in a field long regulated by
the federal government.
The case relied on by the SEC concerning "field preemption" appears
inapposite and distinguishable.3 5 In Sperry v. Florida, the Supreme Court
overruled the state's requirement that all patent agents be admitted
attorneys.30 6 However, the Constitution and history had long established the
supremacy of the federal government in regulating practice in the patent
office. The power of Congress to establish the patent office is set forth in
the Constitution, and it had expressly granted authority to the Commissioner
of Patents to prescribe regulations which permitted non-lawyer agents.30 7
Notwithstanding this broad grant of authority to the federal government, the
authority of states to discipline patent lawyers is not preempted.3 8
The prerequisites for a finding of "field preemption" are
well-summarized in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n:
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supercede
state law altogether may be found from a "'scheme of federal
regulation... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' because 'the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject,' or because 'the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it... [evidence that purpose of
dominance].309
Put another way, "field preemption ' 31° occurs where Congress has "left no
304. 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003); accord Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203
(N.D. Cal. 2003); Jevne v. Super. Ct., 113 Cal. App. 4th 486 (2003).
305. See the Public Statement, supra, note 79; see also infra notes 316-19 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the other case cited by the SEC in support of Part 205 having preempted state
regulation of the attorney-client relationship.
306. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
307. Id. at 384.
308. Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
309. 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
310. The term appears to have its origin in the first decision by the U.S. Supreme Court applying
the concept, in which it held that Congress had "taken possession of the field" by regulating railroad
rates when it adopted the Interstate Commerce Act, even while not actually using the term
room" 31' for any form of regulation (parallel, supplemental, or
implementing) by the states. It is important to note that the test is not
whether a particular regulation "occupies the field" or seeks to do so, but
whether that results from a law passed by Congress under which that
regulation is adopted or from the cumulative effect of multiple laws
including the one under which that regulation is adopted.31 2
Again, it is significant that "field preemption" is an implied preemption.
Applying the standards from the Pacific Gas case, 13 the SEC would bear the
burden of proof314 in demonstrating that
Congress intended with the passage of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to create a regulatory scheme so pervasive that there
would be no room for the states to adopt any law at all on the topic
of attorney obligations to honor and protect client confidentiality;
the federal interest in regulating the attorney-client relationship is so
dominant that the states have no cognizable interest in that topic;
and
Congress intended in adopting Section 307 to demonstrate its
purpose of exclusive control over the attorney-client relationship.
None of that is evident in the legislative history of Section 307.
Accordingly, a court should decline to find that "field preemption" exists in
the context of the Part 205 Rules.
I. Conflict Preemption
The second line of analysis in questions of implied preemption relates to
situations in which a federal law conflicts with a state law or regulation such
that it is not possible to comply with both. It is important to note that this
analysis does not focus on such conflict as between state law and a federal
regulation ostensibly adopted under that federal law but rather on the law
itself.
31 5
Such conflict might exist if Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had
forbidden lawyers to "report up" within the corporation. Various state
provisions (including those of California) 316 specifically authorize an
"preemption." S. Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 442 (1912).
311. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
312. See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
313. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04.
314. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
315. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("The first inquiry is whether Congress,
pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, has prohibited state regulation
of the particular aspects of commerce involved in this case."). See also supra notes 251 and 263 and
accompanying text.
316. CAL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B)(2) (2001).
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attorney to do so. Similarly, a conflict would exist (at least with respect to
California provisions) if Section 307 of the Act had specifically required that
attorneys practicing before the SEC "report out" of the corporation to the
SEC. Neither situation is present here. Indeed, there is nothing in the text of
Section 307 which an attorney would be prevented by California law or
regulations from doing. The letter from the WSBA President dated August
11, 2003, to the General Counsel of the SEC specifically made that point
with respect to the State of Washington's laws.317
The other case cited by the SEC in support of preemption, 3 8 Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, held that a federal
regulation promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board under the
Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 ("HOLA") preempted inconsistent
California law.319  However, the HOLA was enacted by Congress to
establish a uniform system of savings and loan associations where none
previously had existed.32 0  The regulation was issued pursuant to a
Congressional grant of "plenary authority" and only after Congress
expressly approved the Board's promulgation of regulations superseding
state law.321
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized several prerequisites for a
finding of "conflict preemption": 1) preemption is a matter of degree and is
applicable only to the extent that there is an actual conflict with the federal
law,322 2) such actual conflict results in it being impossible to comply both
with the federal law and the conflicting state provisions,323 and 3)
implementation of the conflicting state law would create an insurmountable
obstacle to compliance with the federal law. 4 As with field preemption,
this is an implied preemption theory. The SEC would thus have the burden
of proving that these prerequisites have been met.325 It would have a
particularly difficult time doing so because: (i) it has already conceded
attorneys could comply with both the Part 205 Rules and state restrictions on
divulging client confidences simply by electing not to do so,326 and (ii) there
is no evidence in the legislative history of Section 307, as shown above, that
any of those prerequisites have been met, much less all of them.
327
317. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
318. See the Public Statement, supra note 79 and accompanying text. See supra notes305-307 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the other case cited by the SEC in support of the Part 205
Rules having preempted state regulation of the attorney-client relationship.
319. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
320. Id. at 166.
321. Id.
322. Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474,476 (1996).
323. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987).
324. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
325. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
J. Summary Perspective on the SEC's Authority and its Preemption Claim
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is very clear in granting
authority to the SEC to promulgate regulations "setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before" the SEC. 8  It is far less clear whether the specific example of
reporting "up the ladder" is sufficient authority to promulgate rules changing
long-standing state regulation of the obligation of attorneys to preserve
confidential information of clients as the Part 205 Rules do. Even if it did,
however, there is a complete paucity of evidence that it intended any such
regulation of the attorney-client relationship to be exclusive and to supersede
state regulation. The analysis set forth in this part demonstrates that a court
could reasonably conclude that the Part 205 Rules did not satisfy the
"authority" requirements of case law or the Administrative Procedures Act.
It further shows that a court should conclude that neither Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act nor the Part 205 Rules preempt state regulation of the
attorney-client relationship and the prohibition of an attorney disclosing
confidential information of a client without its consent.329
IV. CONCLUSION
When an attorney subject to the California Rules of Conduct is acting on
behalf of an organization and he or she knows that an agent of the
organization acts in a manner that is or may be a violation of law or in a
manner which is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,33 °
that attorney "shall not violate his or her duty of protecting all confidential
information as provided in" 331 Section 6068(e). Such attorney may,
however, "take such actions as appear to... [him or her] to be in the best
lawful interest of the organization" 332 which actions include, similar to the
SEC's Part 205 Rules, reporting "up-the-ladder" to prevent the unlawful
conduct. Where an attorney is unsuccessful in obtaining redress within the
organization, then Rule 3-600(C) mandates that the "member's response is
limited to the member's right, and, where appropriate, duty to resign in
accordance with rule 3-700." 333
The SEC's Part 205 Rules state that an attorney appearing and
practicing before the SEC in the representation of an issuer may reveal to the
SEC, without the consent of the "issuer", confidential information to the
328. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784.
329. The Corporations Committee has raised similar concerns regarding preemption of state law
in its comments on the SEC's proposed rules regarding "Security Holder Director Nominations."
Letter from Corp. Comm. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Dec. 19, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/calbar121903.htm.
330. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of CAL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3-600 (2001).
331. CAL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2001).
332. Id.
333. Id. R. 3-600(C) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text
(discussing R. 3-700).
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extent that the attorney believes such disclosure is reasonably necessary to
prevent specified harms or to "rectify" the consequences of past
violations.334 As discussed in this article, doing so would, in almost all
cases, result in a conflict with obligations imposed under Business and
Professions Code Section 6068(e).
An attorney relying upon the SEC's safe harbor in disclosing client
confidences to the SEC would be doing so at his or her own peril. The
attorney would have to be confident that:
" the attorney is "appearing and practicing" before the SEC
in the representation of the issuer and the confidential
information was related to that representation, as
determined by the interlocking and confusing component
provisions of the Part 205 Rules;
3 5
* disclosure was reasonably necessary to prevent or rectify a
"material violation" likely to cause "substantial" injury to
the financial interests or property of the client or investors,
or other violations specifically covered by the Part 205
Rules, thereby falling within the threshold provisions of the
safe harbor;
" he or she could satisfactorily demonstrate that such
disclosure would be a "good faith" reliance on the safe
harbor; and
* the SEC's claim of federal preemption with respect to the
Part 205 Rules being relied upon as justification for
disclosure would be upheld despite the lack of case law and
legislative history clearly and unambiguously supporting
the SEC's claim of preemption.
This analysis may be tested in a variety of contexts for which the controlling
issues might not be the same, including the following: (a) a State Bar
disciplinary proceeding, or (b) a malpractice/breach of fiduciary duty action
by the attorney's client.
Notwithstanding the SEC's invitation that attorneys disclose client
confidences to the SEC, prudence dictates that an attorney subject to
Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e) involved with a client
334. See supra note 34 (discussing the use of the defined term "issuer" instead of client); see also
supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's permissive disclosure rule).
335. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
149
engaged in unlawful practices follow the Rules of Professional Conduct 3-
600 and 3-700 unless and until the validity of the SEC's permissive
disclosure rule is resolved by an appellate court in the SEC's favor.**
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Not all of the Members of the Corporations Committee necessarily endorse each and every
conclusion or view expressed in this article and it should not be construed to be the position of any
one of them specifically. Taken as a whole, however, this article reflects the overwhelming
consensus of the Members on the date of approval and constitutes the formal position of the
Corporations Committee as an institution pursuant to vote of the Members.
Publication of this article in the name of the Corporations Committee was approved by vote of the
2003-04 Section Executive Committee, Charles L. Crouch, III, Chair. This article does not,
however, represent the formal position of the Section, the Section Executive Committee, or the
members of the Section on any of the matters addressed in it. It similarly does not represent the
formal position of the State Bar itself or its members.
